United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.1

# General Assembly
Forty-ninth Session

*Official Records*

## First Committee

1st Meeting
Tuesday, 20 September 1994, 4.10 p.m.
New York

*Temporary Chairman*: Mr. Essy . . . . . (Côte d'Ivoire, President of the General Assembly)

*The meeting was called to order at 4.10 p.m.*

**Election of the Chairman of the First Committee**

**The Temporary Chairman** *(interpretation from French)*: Rule 103 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly provides that each Main Committee shall elect a Chairman, one or more Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur. These officers shall be elected on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, experience and personal competence.

The elections shall be held by secret ballot unless the Committee decides otherwise in an election where only one candidate is standing. The nomination of each candidate shall be limited to one speaker, after which the Committee shall immediately proceed to the election.

Furthermore, rule 110 of the rules of procedure provides that congratulations to the officers of a Main Committee shall not be expressed except by the Chairman of the previous session — or, in his absence, by a member of his delegation — after all the officers of the Committee have been elected.

This meeting has been convened for the election of the Chairman of the First Committee.

Are there any nominations?

**Mr. Henze** (Germany): Next week the head of the delegation of Germany to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session — Foreign Minister Mr. Klaus Kinkel — will express to you, Sir, our congratulations on your election to the presidency of the Assembly. However, I wish to take this opportunity to extend to you our best wishes on your election today.

At the same time I should like to convey to your predecessor, Mr. Samuel Insanally of Guyana, our deeply felt appreciation and our thanks for his great efforts and his outstanding role in guiding the work of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.

In the absence of Ambassador von Wagner, who was the Chairman of the First Committee during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, I have the privilege of conveying to the Committee, on his behalf, sincere appreciation for the cooperation and support that he received as Chairman throughout the session.

It is my great honour to propose Mr. Luis Valencia-Rodríguez, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations as Chairman of the First Committee during the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Ambassador Valencia-Rodríguez is both a distinguished diplomat and a highly respected scholar. His outstanding skills in the field of international law and diplomacy are widely known and appreciated. Prior to his appointment as Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations, he served his country in a variety of roles — notably as Ambassador to Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Argentina — as well as in the capacity of leader or member of numerous official delegations to various multilateral forums.

94-86376 (E)

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief, Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178, and incorporated in a copy of the record. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

I should also like to highlight the fact that Ambassador Valencia-Rodríguez is by no means a newcomer to the United Nations. From 1959 until 1964 he served at the permanent mission of Ecuador — first as Counsellor, and then as Minister. From 1974 to 1981 he headed the delegation of Ecuador to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and he headed his country's delegations to the thirtieth and thirty-seventh sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.

From 1970 to 1986 Ambassador Valencia-Rodríguez, in his personal capacity, was a member of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. He has served in the same capacity since 1992, and his service will continue until 1996. He chaired that Committee during three of its terms.

As I mentioned earlier, Ambassador Valencia-Rodríguez is also a highly respected scholar. He has taught in the areas of diplomatic practice, the pacific settlement of international disputes and the law of the sea, and he has published extensively in these areas, as well as in the field of human rights.

I am deeply convinced that, in view of his extensive experience and his diplomatic skills, Ambassador Valencia-Rodríguez will be an excellent Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly, especially at this time when the world community and the Assembly face fundamental challenges that have a direct effect on international peace and security as well as on disarmament — the areas that define the work of the First Committee.

I propose that Ambassador Valencia-Rodríguez be elected Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

**The Temporary Chairman** *(interpretation from French):* His Excellency Mr. Luis Valencia-Rodríguez has been nominated by the representative of Germany. Since only one candidate has been nominated, I propose that under rule 103 the Committee decide not to hold a secret ballot.

*It was so decided.*

**The Temporary Chairman** *(interpretation from French):* I therefore declare His Excellency Mr. Luis Valencia-Rodríguez of Ecuador elected Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

*The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.*



United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.2

General Assembly
Forty-ninth session
*Official Records*

First Committee

2nd Meeting
Thursday, 13 October 1994, 10 a.m.
New York

*Chairman*: Mr. Valencia-Rodríguez . . . . . (Ecuador)

*The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.*

**Statement by the Chairman**

**The Chairman:** It is a great pleasure and an honour for me to preside over the deliberations of the First Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Permit me at the outset to extend a warm and sincere welcome to all of you who are participating in the meetings of the First Committee at this session of the General Assembly. I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound appreciation to all States Members of the United Nations for the privilege and honour that they have bestowed upon me and my country by electing me as Chairman of this body.

I would also like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Ambassador Gerhard Walter Henze of Germany for graciously nominating me as a candidate for the chairmanship of the First Committee for the current session. I wish, through him, to convey to Ambassador Adolf von Wagner the appreciation of the First Committee, which benefited immensely from his wisdom and diplomatic skill when he presided over the deliberations of the Committee last year. He made an important contribution to the results achieved by the Committee during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

I am fully aware of the fact that I am following in the tradition of chairmen who presided very skilfully over the deliberations and work of the Committee in the last several years. I intend, with the help, guidance and indulgence of the Committee, to discharge the high responsibilities of my post with determination, devotion and impartiality in order to ensure that the Committee's work is conducted in an orderly manner and that our endeavours will result in a successful conclusion. In doing so, I count on the constructive cooperation and assistance of the Committee's entire membership. It is gratifying to know that I can also count on the most valuable experience, competence and profound knowledge of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Marrack Goulding; to the Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Prvoslav Davinic; and to the Secretary of the First Committee, Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, who has each year so ably cooperated with the Chair and the other officers of the Committee and contributed to the successful completion of the work of the Committee.

At this meeting the First Committee will elect the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur and discuss the organization of the work of the Committee at the current session of the General Assembly.

**Election of the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur**

**The Chairman**: I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 1935th meeting on 22 September 1971 concerning the procedure for the election of officers of the Main Committees. According to the terms of that decision, the nominations of candidates should be limited to one statement for each candidate, after which the Committee should immediately proceed to the election. The Committee will therefore follow that procedure today.

94-86636 (E)

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

**Mr. Ponce** (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In my capacity as one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Committee at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly I am pleased and honoured to present the candidacy of Mr. Thomas Stelzer, Minister and Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Austria, to one of the posts of Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. Stelzer received a Doctorate in Law from the University of Vienna, a diploma in international relations from the School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna and a Master of Arts degree in Latin studies from Stamford University. He has been a member of the Foreign Service of his country since 1988 and was stationed in Vienna at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and, since 1990 he has been attached to the Permanent Mission of Austria in New York, where he has attended meetings of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. He is well known and appreciated by all of us.

Mr. Stelzer's skills have been recognized. In the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) he became Rapporteur of the Coordinating Committee and he is also an expert in the field of verification. In addition to his personal qualities and his sense of responsibility, his professional skills are well known to all delegations and we are certain he will make an essential contribution to the success of our work.

**The Chairman** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Ecuador for nominating this candidate. On behalf of the Committee, I wish also to convey to him our sincere thanks for the important contribution he made as Vice-Chairman of the Committee at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

(*spoke in English*)

As there are no other nominations, I shall take it that, in accordance with rule 103 of the rules of procedure and with established practice, the Committee wishes to dispense with a secret ballot and declare Mr. Stelzer, of Austria, elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

*It was so decided.*

**The Chairman**: I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who also served as a Vice-Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

**Mr. Moradi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your well-deserved election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. The formal congratulations of the delegation of Iran will be extended to you at an appropriate time in the course of the current session.

As I had the honour to be a Vice-Chairman of the First Committee during its forty-eighth session, it is now my honour and privilege, on behalf of my delegation, to nominate Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan for the post of Vice-Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Although Ambassador Tanaka, current head of the delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, is so well known to this Committee that he needs no introduction, I wish to refer briefly to his long and widely-appreciated diplomatic career. He graduated from the Faculty of Law of Tokyo University in 1956 and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the same year. He held various positions in the Ministry from 1972 to 1991, including the Directorate of the Disarmament Division and the Scientific Affairs Division of the United Nations Bureau, and was Deputy Director-General of the European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau. He also served at the Japanese Embassies at Vienna and Moscow as Counsellor and at Dacca as Ambassador in the same period.

I wish also to note that Mr. Tanaka served as Ambassador and Chief Inspector to South America. In April 1992, he was assigned as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and as head of the delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

My delegation is fully convinced that Ambassador Tanaka's extensive experience in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy will help the Committee to achieve concrete results. I therefore commend to the Committee his nomination as a Vice-Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

**The Chairman**: I am certain that I am expressing the sentiments of the Committee when I thank Mr. Moradi for the very valuable contribution that he made last year as Vice-Chairman.

As there are no other nominations, I shall take it that in this instance also the Committee wishes to dispense with the secret ballot and to declare Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee by acclamation.

*It was so decided.*

**The Chairman**: I wish now to express my warmest congratulations to the two Vice-Chairmen and assure them of my confidence that we shall jointly discharge the important responsibilities incumbent upon us.

I should like to inform you that consultations are still continuing regarding the candidacy for the post of Rapporteur. Accordingly, we will defer the election of the Rapporteur until a later stage, pending the outcome of those consultations.

*It was so decided.*

**The Chairman**: May I draw the attention of the Committee to rule 110 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which reads as follows:

> "Congratulations to the officers of a Main Committee shall not be expressed except by the Chairman of the previous session — or, in his absence, by a member of his delegation — after all the officers of the Committee have been elected."

I hope that this rule will be applied and respected today and in the future and I shall be personally grateful to all delegations if they would dispense with that customary passage at the beginning of their statements.

**Mr. Hoffmann** (Germany): It was an honour and a pleasure for my delegation recently to propose, Sir, on behalf of the outgoing Chairman of the First Committee, Ambassador von Wagner, your candidature to the chairmanship of the First Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. I should now like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on assuming this important post. As my delegation noted when presenting you for the chairmanship of the First Committee, you have the experience and diplomatic skills needed to guide the work of the First Committee at a time when the United Nations is faced with fundamental challenges to peace and security, various important aspects of which are being considered by this Committee. Accordingly, I wish you, Mr. Chairman, all the very best for the future in discharging your important duties. At the same time, I should like to assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation in efforts to bring our work to a successful conclusion.

I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan and Mr. Thomas Stelzer, of Austria, on their election to the posts of Vice-Chairmen of this Committee. Moreover, on behalf of Ambassador von Wagner, I should like to express thanks for the kind words about him and to thank the Chairman and all the members of the Committee for their constructive contributions to the Committee's work, as well as for the cooperation and support they afforded him.

I should also like to take this opportunity to convey Ambassador von Wagner's sincere gratitude for the valuable assistance he received from members of the United Nations Secretariat, in particular the Secretary of the First Committee, Mr. Kheradi, and the other officers of the Committee.

At the last meeting of the First Committee at the General Assembly's forty-eighth session, on 9 September 1994, Ambassador von Wagner expressed his wish for the future that the Committee might rationalize its work and reform its agenda to the point where it could focus primarily on topical items directly affecting international peace and security and could thus contribute actively to mastering the enormous challenges facing the world community today.

As a first step towards modernization, Ambassador von Wagner sought to concentrate his efforts as Chairman on the further rationalization of the work of the Committee. In so doing his constant desire was to ensure a broad consensus of the members of the Committee. To this end he conducted a series of consultations, the outcome of which led to the adoption of a resolution 48/87 and subsequently of a decision containing an annex that could form the basis for further deliberations. As this annex is composed solely of contributions by members of the Committee it is Ambassador von Wagner's hope that it might be implemented after further consultations with a view to making the lives of all of us easier, thereby freeing mental energy and time that could be put to productive use in dealing with the host of unresolved topical issues facing us.

Against this background I should like to encourage you, Mr. Chairman, to continue the process of rationalization begun many years ago. It is certainly a continuing process, however incremental, and we should not be discouraged by occasional obstacles or perceived set-backs but rather seek all the more to overcome them using the combined wisdom and experience of yourself, Mr. Chairman, and of the other members of the Committee.

**The Chairman**: On behalf of the officers of the Committee, as well as on my own behalf, I thank the representative of Germany for the kind words he addressed to me and to other officers of the Committee. I very much appreciate the pledge of cooperation extended to me personally and to the entire Committee in the discharging of our responsibilities. I particularly value the assurance of friendship and collaboration, which we shall certainly need in the successful discharge of our responsibilities.

**Mr. Stelzer** (Austria): I thank my colleague and friend from Ecuador for suggesting me as a Vice-Chairman of the Committee and I thank the members of the First Committee for bestowing on me the great honour, and entrusting me with the responsibility, of serving in this Bureau. I am very well aware that I find myself in this Bureau in the company of very illustrious personalities of international disarmament and I pledge to you, Mr. Chairman, my collaboration and support during the course of the work of the First Committee.

**The Chairman**: I thank the representative of Austria, Mr. Thomas Stelzer, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, for the kind remarks he addressed to me, and I certainly look forward to a very harmonious working relationship.

**Mr. Takahashi** (Japan): I should like to express my appreciation to the representative of Iran for the excellent manner in which he discharged his responsibilities as Vice-Chairman of the First Committee during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

On behalf of Ambassador Tanaka and the Japanese delegation I should like to reaffirm that the Government of Japan attaches great importance to the work of the First Committee and is determined to contribute actively to ensuring the success of its endeavours. Ambassador Tanaka is expected to arrive in New York soon and is looking forward to seeing all the members of the Committee. Again I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, the Vice-Chairmen, and all members of the First Committee for supporting the candidature of Ambassador Tanaka to the position of Vice-Chairman.

**The Chairman**: I thank the representative of Japan for his kind words addressed to me and to other officers of the Committee and I wish fully to reciprocate those sentiments. I am certain that I can count on his active assistance and cooperation.

The Committee has elected the two Vice-Chairman but will need to revert to the matter of the election of the Rapporteur at a later stage.

**Organization of work**

**The Chairman**: I draw the attention of members to document A/C.1/49/1 containing a letter dated 23 September 1994 addressed to me by the President of the General Assembly at the forty-ninth session and informing me that the General Assembly at its third meeting had decided to allocate 22 items to the First Committee for its consideration, namely agenda items 53 to 73 and 153.

Before I proceed to give a fuller account of the Committee's proposed programme of work and timetable for the current session, I should like to provide some preliminary explanations.

As members are aware, according to established practice, the First Committee commences its substantive work only after the conclusion of the general debate in plenary meetings of the Assembly. In view of the Assembly's decision, upon the recommendation of the General Committee, that all the Main Committees should make every effort to complete their work by 2 December 1994, members will notice that the proposed time-frame within which the First Committee would need to complete its work would be from Monday, 17 October, to Wednesday, 23 November.

At this stage I would point out that last year the Committee utilized a total of 32 meetings and in spite of the limitations it was able to complete its work on Wednesday, 24 November 1993, that is, one day before the Thanksgiving holiday. Hence, I am sure that if we make concerted and sincere efforts fully to utilize the conference facilities and resources available to us in an effective manner, the Committee will be able to finish its work on time and will accomplish its tasks without undue difficulty.

In order to facilitate the work of the Committee I have conducted a series of extensive informal consultations with a number of individual delegations and representatives of regional groups on the programme of work and timetable of the Committee. I and the officers of the Committee with the assistance of the secretariat, especially the Secretary of the Committee, have arrived at the proposed programme of work and timetable — document A/C.1/49/3 — which was considered and accepted *ad referendum*, at the informal meeting of the Committee held on Wednesday, 5 October. I hope that it will receive the approval of all members so

that the Committee may be enabled to adopt it at this meeting. In preparing the proposed programme of work and timetable, I have taken into account the practice and precedents which have evolved over recent years, as well as ideas and suggestions put forward during the last session of the First Committee in order to enable the Committee to conclude its work and to meet its responsibilities in a smooth and efficient manner.

As indicated in the programme of work, the Committee will consider all the agenda items allocated to it under three main categories: first, those items dealing with disarmament and international security, that is, agenda items 53 to 66 and 68 to 72 and 153; secondly, agenda item 73 relating to "Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee"; and thirdly, agenda item 67, "Question of Antarctica".

At this juncture, I should like to indicate that a precise deadline has been set for the submission of all draft resolutions under each of the aforementioned three categories in order to give sufficient time for delegations to conduct the necessary consultations, as well as to seek instructions from their respective Governments before the Committee proceeds to take a decision on the draft resolutions concerned.

The deadline for the submission of draft resolutions under all disarmament agenda items, namely items 53 to 66, 69, 71, 72 and 153, will be Tuesday, 27 October 1994, at 6 p.m., and the deadline for the submission of all draft resolutions under international security agenda items, namely, items 68 to 70 will be Thursday, 3 November 1994, at 6 p.m. I request cooperation from all delegations concerned in adhering strictly to those deadlines. Next, the deadline for submission of draft resolutions under agenda item 73 ill be Friday, 11 November 1994, at 6 p.m. Finally the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions under agenda item 67 will be Monday, 21 November 1994, at 6 p.m.

Delegations are strongly encouraged to submit their draft resolutions as early as possible, especially those draft resolutions that have programme budget implications, in order to meet the mandatory deadline for the submission to the Fifth Committee of all draft resolutions with financial implications.

I should like to propose that the First Committee should begin its substantive work on Monday, 17 October, by holding a short general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items, namely items 53 to 66, 68 to 72, and 153. A total of nine meetings from Monday, 17 October, to Monday, 24 October 1994, will be allocated for this stage of the work of the Committee.

In this connection, I should like to request delegations, if at all possible, kindly to limit the time for delivery of their statements to 10 minutes in order to enable all those delegations wishing to do so to participate in the general debate within the time period allotted.

Moreover, in order to use the time and conference facilities available to the Committee fully and constructively, I invite delegations kindly to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible. Furthermore, it should be noted that the date for the closure of the list of speakers on all disarmament and international security agenda items will Monday, 17 October, at 6 p.m.

Before proceeding to the next stage of our work, I should like to inform the Committee that at our first substantive meeting, which will take place on Monday, 17 October, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, will address the First Committee. May I take this opportunity to request delegations kindly to be present in the conference room punctually at 10 a.m. so that the meeting can be convened on time.

From Tuesday, 25 October, to Thursday, 27 October, and from Monday, 31 October, to Tuesday, 1 November, the First Committee will hold structured discussions on specific subjects on the adopted thematic approach on disarmament and international security agenda items. A total of eight meetings will be devoted to this phase of the work of the Committee. In this regard, I should like to say that I and the officers of the Committee, with the assistance and cooperation of the Secretariat, will provide the necessary information to delegations well in advance regarding each subject and the time allocated for its consideration.

As indicated in the programme of work and timetable, the meeting of the First Committee on Friday, 28 October 1994, will be devoted to a special meeting of the Committee in observance of Disarmament Week. I should also like to inform members of the Committee that the Twelfth Pledging Conference for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme will be convened immediately following the special meeting of the First Committee.

With regard to the third phase of our work, a period from Thursday, 3 November, to Wednesday, 9 November, will be devoted to the consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items — items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153. A total of five meetings will be at the disposal of the Committee for that purpose.

Beginning Thursday, 10 November, an exchange of views will be held on agenda item 73, "Rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee", and a total of two meetings will be allocated for this stage of our work.

The next stage of the work of the Committee will take place from Friday, 11 November, to Friday, 18 November 1994. It will be devoted to taking action on all draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items, including item 73, related to the rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee. A total of nine meetings will be available to the Committee for that phase of the work of the Committee.

In this connection, it is my intention to retain during the current session, as was the practice at previous ones, the voting procedure involving the grouping of all resolutions by clusters and I shall, at an appropriate time, present to the Committee specific proposals concerning this matter.

After the conclusion of the consideration of all disarmament and international security items, including item 73 related to the question of the rationalization of the work and reform of the agenda of the First Committee — namely items 53 to 66, 68 to 73 and 153 — the Committee will then proceed to agenda item 67, entitled "Question of Antarctica". The Committee will devote the period from Monday, 21 November, to Wednesday, 23 November — a total of four meetings — to a general debate on, consideration of and action upon draft resolutions submitted under that item. The deadline for submission of draft resolutions under agenda item 67 will be Monday, 21 November, at 6 p.m.

Furthermore, I should like once again to emphasize that it is absolutely imperative that the deadline be met for the submission to the Fifth Committee of all draft resolutions entailing programme budget implications.

On the basis of the proposed programme of work and timetable now before the Committee, I believe that we should be able to conclude the consideration of all agenda items allocated to us within the available time, by 23 November.

If there are no comments and no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with the suggested programme of work and timetable as contained in document A/C.1/49/3.

*It was so decided.*

**The Chairman:** I should like now to draw the Committee's attention to decision 34/401 of the General Assembly affecting the work of the Main Committees, in particular to its provisions dealing with explanations of vote, right of reply, and budgetary and financial issues, which I would like to apply with the cooperation of all members of the Committee.

In order fully to utilize the time and conference facilities available to the Committee, I intend to open the meetings of the Committee at 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. and make every effort to adjourn the meetings at 1 p.m. and 6 p.m., respectively.

Furthermore, I wish to indicate that it is my intention to convene meetings of the Committee when a sufficient number of speakers are on the list of speakers so that we can make full use of the time and resources available to us in the most effective manner possible. I should like to add that resources allocated to a meeting cancelled at an appropriate time may be released for other meetings held within or outside the framework of the First Committee.

At this stage, I call on the Secretary of the Committee to make a statement on certain matters pertaining to the proceedings of the First Committee.

**Mr. Kheradi** (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to draw the attention of delegations to the following points. I should like first of all to invite delegations' attention to the fact that this year once again the General Assembly has decided to depart, during its forty-ninth session, from the rule that a quarter of the members must be present before a meeting of a Main Committee may be declared open and debate permitted to proceed. The General Assembly made that recommendation on the understanding that such a waiver did not imply any permanent change in the relevant provisions of rules 67 and 108 of the rules of procedure pertaining to the opening of meetings whereby a majority of members must be present for any decision to be taken. Further, such a waiver would

not affect the provision of the rules of procedure concerning the requirement of the presence of a majority of members for any decision to be taken.

In accordance with the Committee's programme of work and timetable that has just been adopted, the list of speakers for the general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items will be closed on Monday, 17 October, at 6 p.m. A number of delegations have already indicated their intention to participate in the general debate on those items, and the Secretariat has taken note of those requests. In order to utilize fully the conference facilities available to the Committee, all delegations are requested to inscribe their names on the list of speakers at their earliest convenience, if possible even today.

As you mentioned earlier, Sir, members of the Committee are urged to submit draft resolutions, especially those which have programme budget implications or entail programme budget statements, as far in advance as possible in order to allow sufficient time for the preparation of the estimate of expenditures by the Secretariat and for its consideration by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. A minimum period of 48 hours should be allowed between the submission of, and the voting on, a proposal involving expenditure in order to allow the Secretary-General to prepare and present the related statement of administrative and financial implications.

That would certainly facilitate the Secretariat's task of processing the drafts in a timely manner and, if I may venture to say so, would provide enough time to members of the Committee for consultations and for seeking the necessary instructions, as required.

I request members of the Committee to note that draft resolutions and amendments and the names of sponsors thereof should be communicated to the Secretariat in writing to ensure accuracy and to avoid any subsequent misunderstandings.

Requests for the use of conference rooms for group meetings should be submitted in writing as early as possible, so that the necessary arrangements can be made in time.

I should like furthermore to draw the attention of members of the Committee to rule 153 of the rules of procedure, which reads as follows:

> "No resolution involving expenditure shall be recommended by a committee for approval by the General Assembly unless it is accompanied by an estimate of expenditures prepared by the Secretary-General. No resolution in respect of which expenditures are anticipated by the Secretary-General shall be voted by the General Assembly until the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee) has had an opportunity of stating the effect of the proposal upon the budget estimates of the United Nations."

I wish once again to draw the attention of members to General Assembly decision 34/401, particularly its provisions dealing with explanations of vote and rights of reply. At this stage I shall not go into detail regarding this matter, but would refer members to paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of that decision, which pertain to those particular issues.

I should also like to draw the Committee's attention to document A/C.1/49/INF/1, which was issued a few days ago. For the purpose of information and ready reference, this document lists all documents before the First Committee that had been issued as of 14 October 1994. This particular document will be updated and revisions will be issued as appropriate.

I would ask delegations kindly to submit the list of members of their delegations to the First Committee secretariat as soon as possible, in order to facilitate the circulation of the Committee's membership list at as early a stage of the session as possible.

In addition to the copies requested for general distribution to the representatives with respect to statements of delegations, delegations are requested to provide to the conference officers a minimum of 30 copies of all prepared statements for conference-servicing purposes.

Finally, may I emphasize that everything possible will be done to ensure adherence to the timetable adopted. In the final analysis, members will need to be mindful of the fact that the due degree of flexibility will need to be exercised from time to time as necessary. This will of course depend upon the contingencies and circumstances involved, including the availability of the necessary conference facilities.

Before I conclude my remarks, I hope you will permit me to refer to one other matter, and this concerns the question of a letter that was transmitted by the Chairman of the Fifth Committee to the Chairman of the First

Committee as contained in document A/C.1/49/2, entitled "Allocation of items to the First Committee". We have looked into this matter and explored the issue, and I have just received, as a result, a communication from the Secretary of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly that states as follows:

> "With reference to the letter of the Chairman of the Fifth Committee addressed to the Chairman of the First Committee, dated 26 September 1994, as contained in document A/C.1/49/2, regarding the proposed revisions to the medium-term plan 1992-1997, I wish to advise you that none of the programmes being revised is of relevance to the work of the First Committee."

Should there be any further developments concerning this matter, I will of course bring them to the attention of the Committee accordingly.

*The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.*



United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.3

# General Assembly
Forty-ninth session

*Official Records*

## First Committee

3rd Meeting
Monday, 17 October 1994, 10 a.m.
New York

*Chairman*: Mr. Valencia-Rodríguez . . . . . (Ecuador)

*The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.*

**Statement by the Chairman**

**The Chairman**: I have the pleasure and the honour of welcoming to the Disarmament and International Security Committee, the First Committee, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

I also have the pleasure of welcoming to the Committee Mr. Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.

This morning, in accordance with its programme of work and timetable, the Committee will begin its general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items.

**Statement by the Secretary-General**

**The Chairman:** I should like first to call on the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to address the First Committee.

**The Secretary-General:** To you, Sir, I offer my congratulations on your appointment as Chairman of the First Committee. With your diplomatic skills and expertise, you are well qualified to guide this Committee through its challenging agenda.

I welcome this opportunity to address the First Committee. I last addressed the Committee during the resumed meetings of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly. That I come to address you again today is an indication and an expression of the importance that I, and the United Nations, attach to the Committee's work.

The First Committee continues to make a major contribution to international security and to the search for a lasting global peace. The past year has confirmed the wisdom of combining in the Committee the consideration of arms control and disarmament with consideration of the wider concerns of international security. The way Member States assess and understand challenges in these areas shapes their response to them. Definition of the challenges, and a coherent understanding of their interconnections, is essential.

Progress in international security and disarmament depends upon the continuation of this integrated approach. Never before has there been such an opportunity for global cooperation towards arms control and disarmament. We must make full use of this opportunity. Not only do arms control and disarmament make the world more secure, but they free up economic, scientific and technological resources for peace and human progress.

Arms control and disarmament agreements can help prevent conflicts. Such agreements also play an important role in containing conflicts, and in peace-keeping and peacemaking. Some agreements are constructed for peace settlements — concerning, for example, disputed territory or resources. Others are designed to ban, limit or regulate weapons and armed forces. Such distinctions, however,

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should not be debilitating. Both types of agreement are integral to the same, overall effort. In working on arms control and disarmament issues, this connection should be seamless. This applies to global, regional and bilateral agreements, whether politically or legally binding.

I set out this way of thinking in my 1992 report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era". I want to stress that this concept remains valid.

In a similar vein, I should like to mention two other distinctions. One is between global agreements and regional or bilateral agreements. The other is between developed and developing countries. These distinctions are real, and they should inform our efforts — but we cannot allow them to impede our progress.

Bearing this in mind, I should like to refer to specific issues of concern to this Committee.

At its summit meeting in January 1992, the Security Council declared that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international security. This declaration has reinforced the resolve of the international community. It has strengthened our commitment to adhere to the global norms enshrined in existing treaties.

I look forward to the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention. Along with the biological weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it will complete the triad of global treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction.

There are some 157 signatories to the chemical weapons Convention. I urge Member States to maintain the momentum towards the ratification and early entry into force of this treaty. To the biological weapons Convention, there are 131 signatories. I strongly support the efforts under way to improve the implementation of this Convention.

With 165 signatories, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is one of today's global arrangements with the largest number of participants. For the vast majority of the international community, it is the primary normative foundation for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I call upon all Member States to support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT at the forthcoming Review Conference, in 1995. This will not only strengthen its effective implementation but also speed progress towards the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. I look forward to new accessions to the Treaty so that it may become truly universal in acceptance and in practice.

Still more global measures are required, however. I am concerned that negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test ban have not progressed as smoothly as I had hoped. I am encouraged by the text of the draft treaty produced by the Conference on Disarmament, but important issues remain unresolved. I strongly urge the participants in these negotiations to work towards a consensus. An early conclusion of a test-ban treaty is fundamental to real progress in nuclear disarmament and to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Also required is a treaty banning the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Intentions to create such a treaty have been clearly stated, but negotiations on such a treaty have yet to start. We must not allow technical and procedural difficulties to delay negotiations for ever. Now is the time to overcome them. Now is the time to act.

With the NPT, we have seen definitive and positive trends for the quantitative reduction of nuclear weapons. I suggest today that we must now seek to curb qualitative development of such weapons. I believe that a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a treaty on the non-production of fissile material are the most tangible means to that end.

I would also like to stress that there is an urgent need for a binding global a[illegible]eement on security assurances.

As I have mentioned, in the last few years unprecedented strides have been made in actual nuclear disarmament. The United States and Russia have indicated their intention to expedite the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) with regard to reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Other nuclear-weapon States have indicated a willingness to make their own contribution to this process. Within this context, the non-nuclear-weapon States demand — rightly, in my view — stronger international and legally binding security assurances.

I firmly believe that there should be no delay in making such assurances. Especially to those States that have pledged to renounce fully and unconditionally the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons, security assurances must be granted. The nuclear-weapon States

must take the lead in making positive moves towards a binding global agreement on this issue.

All these efforts form a global web of protection against weapons of mass destruction, but they can be successful only with the full commitment and practical participation of all Member States. In my recent meetings with Heads of State and ministers I have stressed the importance of developing new approaches consistent with the present political and security environment. Such approaches are needed, for instance, to provide greater support for the Security Council in its responsibilities concerning weapons of mass destruction.

New approaches are also needed to provide better support to the work of organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agency's current initiatives deal with the problem of the security of nuclear materials; they deserve the full support of all Member States. I am in close contact with Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of the Vienna Agency, on this subject as well as on that of nuclear proliferation in general. Tomorrow, I will meet with him to discuss these issues in further detail. My aim is to ensure the closest possible cooperation between our two offices and to build the necessary political support for the Agency's efforts in these areas.

There have been encouraging developments over the past year which demonstrate the interaction between global and regional dimensions of arms control and disarmament.

I am gratified by the progress achieved by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) towards a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa. Such a treaty will advance global norms.

While much remains to be done, the Middle East process has made substantive progress towards the easing of tensions. This progress is helping to create better conditions for the full implementation of global norms against all weapons of mass destruction in that region. This progress shows what can be achieved when States both inside and outside a region work together on these issues.

At the bilateral level, I am pleased with the intention of the United States and Russia to expedite the reductions of strategic nuclear weapons called for in the START treaties.

Treaties, agreements and regimes give cooperative security arrangements a legal or political foundation, but they must also be built upon firm economic, scientific and technological realities. Accords will be durable and effective so long as they integrate all of these components.

Thus, non-proliferation regimes based on denial alone will not be effective in the long run. To succeed, non-proliferation regimes must be coupled with the transfer of technology for peaceful and legitimate purposes. The Missile Technology Control Regime, for example, should be developed into a cooperative instrument. It should make possible the transfer of advanced technology for peaceful purposes. This suggestion has been made before, but real progress in this direction is yet to be forthcoming.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is intended as a cooperative exercise in confidence-building. In order for it to be successful, the Register must deal with security concerns at both the global and the regional levels.

In this regard, regional entities have an important role to play in making progress in other areas of the process of transparency in armaments. That process is being undertaken through the Conference on Disarmament. I refer specifically here to the transfer of technology with military applications, and to openness and transparency in relation to weapons of mass destruction. The Arms Register is one step towards making more transparent the flow of major conventional arms at the global, regional and subregional levels. I hope this Committee will be able to give the Register the momentum it deserves.

At the same time, we have to face the proliferation of small arms in many countries. Such proliferation is often a residual effect of the cold war or of regional or internal military confrontations.

Recently the President of Mali requested United Nations assistance in dealing with the collection and control of small arms in his country. I dispatched an advisory mission to Mali, which has since provided a list of recommendations to help solve this problem. I intend to push for their speedy implementation.

I also plan to expand the task of the mission to other countries in the same part of the African region. The experience in Mali has shown how action on arms regulation and disarmament can be integrated effectively into the wider field of preventive diplomacy and peace-building.

I cannot end my remarks without reference to the misuse of land-mines. This is a matter of great

humanitarian concern. The misuse of land-mines continues to inflict terrible suffering upon civilian populations, particularly in Africa and Asia.

I am encouraged by the actions a number of Heads of Government have taken on this issue. Today, courageous and professional personnel, provided by Member States, helps the United Nations and affected countries in the dangerous business of mine clearance. I salute their efforts.

Yet the need for international regulation on this issue remains urgent. In my report to the General Assembly on mine clearance I called for an effective control regime. This regime would place strict limits on the production, use and transfer of all land-mines. I trust that this Committee will support efforts to address quickly and effectively this matter of global importance to the lives of thousands of people and its dire consequences.

I welcome views and advice on all these issues. In addition to the insights provided me within the Secretariat, I would like to draw on expertise and experience from outside.

In this context, I value highly the work of my Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. The Board brings together members with skills and expertise across a wide range of disarmament and international security issues.

My message today is that divisions, however real, must not be allowed to stifle progress in arms control and disarmament.

Unlike other forums, the First Committee considers all types of armaments, as well as their means of delivery, in the full context of international security. The Committee's focus is not limited to a particular weapon or to a particular type of agreement. Through the Committee's work, close coordination between global, regional and bilateral dimensions can be advanced. Agreements and frameworks for action can be constructed which recognize the need for economic, scientific and technological development in a secure world environment.

I look forward to a comprehensive and productive debate in the Committee. I trust that in its deliberations it will continue to advance international security and will continue to make a major contribution to the world's collaborative effort for enduring human progress.

**Statement by the Chairman**

**The Chairman** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to document A/C.1/49/1, which contains a communiqué addressed to me by the President of the General Assembly to inform us of the allocation of 22 items to the First Committee.

The Committee's analysis of disarmament activities as a fundamental part of international security confirms the priority the United Nations has given to both subjects. Those two elements have always provided the bases for the various plans for international organization that have been prepared by politicians and statesmen. They have been the fundamental motives of thinkers and international activists.

In this context, nuclear disarmament remains one of the priority tasks for the international community in our times. At the forty-eighth session, consensus was reached on fundamental aspects of disarmament and arms limitation. The positive reaction of many States has encouraged the General Assembly to take action and, moreover, clearly attests to the international community's awareness that true disarmament must be attained.

It is encouraging to recall that, responding to the repeated requests of this Committee, the Conference on Disarmament has entered into serious negotiations to obtain an internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, for this will be the most effective way to put an end to such tests. All States should adhere to such an instrument.

I have no doubt that this Committee will provide the necessary support to ensure that the negotiations in the Conference being conducted under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico will be crowned with success. This will be an important step towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their guises, will contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament and — what is even more important — will strengthen international peace and security.

Similarly, the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is another question of particular importance. Although it is not being taken up directly in the Committee, our work can contribute to the creation of a propitious atmosphere for the negotiations. The 1995 Conference must respond to the international community's fundamental concerns about the dangers inherent in the proliferation of those weapons.

While there are those who support unconditional extension, many States consider that the extension should be accompanied by certain complementary instruments, such as a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a treaty on the production of fissionable material, as well as assurances for non-nuclear States. Such steps would help to create a favourable atmosphere for a request that the nuclear Powers should make concrete plans for the elimination of their nuclear weapons. On the other hand, as has been said, if the NPT were extended for an indefinite period, that might have the contrary effect of making general and complete disarmament an even more distant objective. It might also result in the continuance of undesirable imbalances. These are very sensitive which are related to vital aspects of national security, so they must be considered in all their aspects and taking into account all their consequences.

It should be noted that at the forty-eightn session of the General Assembly there was consensus on the question of prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We must avail ourselves of this opportunity to support the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty on the subject.

There are certain actions that should be undertaken pending the achievement of universal nuclear disarmament. One such action would be the establishment of effective arrangements to guarantee the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The efforts undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament with a view to achieving this objective should be supported. Moreover, we must bear in mind the fact that a universal approach and regional approaches to disarmament are complementary. Thus, efforts in the two fields should be coordinated.

We again note with concern that the proliferation of conventional weapons is contributing to the expansion of armed conflicts in many regions. In this connection we must emphasize the importance of the Register of Conventional Arms and the need to promote its development. The lack of consensus in the Group of Experts should not result in the abandonment of that important tool for the promotion of transparency. Particular attention should also be given to the problem of the increased proliferation of small-calibre weapons — a problem that is likewise of increasing gravity. In any case, the illegal traffic in armaments, of whatever types, is a disturbing phenomenon that has a serious effect on efforts to consolidate peace. That being the case, the Disarmament Commission is to be commended for the work that it has undertaken.

The preparatory work with regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons should be the subject of special consideration in this Committee. No effort should be spared in the drive to achieve universal implementation of that instrument, which will be a decisive advance towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

The item with regard to prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects is another question of particular importance. We note with satisfaction the information we have received concerning the moratorium on the production and exporting of anti-personnel mines that has already been declared by some States. We must reiterate the particular responsibility that is borne by the manufacturers and exporters of such devices.

It must not be forgotten that attempts to prevent the improper use of technology for military purposes cannot be allowed to impede efforts or legitimate opportunities for development. The international transfer of goods, services and high-tech knowledge for peaceful purposes is important for the economic and social development of many countries.

One of the main organs — the Conference on Disarmament — is discharging its difficult responsibilities with efficiency. As a result of the changes in the world, the time has come for the expansion of the membership of the Conference, taking into account the studies already carried out on this subject. Once again I emphasize that peace, disarmament and security are inseparable. This was acknowledged at the first summit meeting of the Security Council, which was held on 31 January 1992. There it was emphasized that security does not merely imply the absence of military confrontation, that the concept includes also social and economic elements and integral development.

There are various measures that could be considered with a view to promoting and strengthening international security. One of the most important of these consists of preventive diplomacy and urgent measures and, for example, the establishment of appropriate political machinery to ensure the prompt and peaceful solution of disputes. We must not overlook measures to guarantee democracy, protect human rights and promote economic

and social development. Mutual trust can be enhanced by means of, among other things, joint action to promote transparency with regard to questions relating to armaments. Efforts must also be pursued to guarantee the viability of all existing disarmament agreements. All of this leads to our reiterating that it is a matter of urgency that States should shoulder their rightful responsibilities with regard to guaranteeing international security.

The essential purpose of all these efforts must be to achieve general and complete disarmament, the elimination of the nuclear threat and of the proliferation of all kinds of weapons and the development of measures that effectively guarantee international security — in other words, to ensure the undiminished reign of law. Only full respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter can provide the firmest foundation to ensure that humanity may at last find the way to peace and security. I am convinced that, with the cooperation of my fellow representatives, the First Committee of the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session will contribute to the achievement of this, our common purpose.

**Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153**

**General debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items**

**Mr. Marin Bosch** (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We have listened with all due attention to your statement, Mr. Chairman, and to the statement just made by the Secretary-General. We would like to say how pleased we were to see him present at the beginning of our debate. We agree that we must make the best possible use of the opportunities before us, given the climate in the international community today with regard to disarmament questions, especially regarding weapons of mass destruction.

The delegation of Mexico congratulates you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the work of this First Committee and assures you of its assurances of its active cooperation. It falls upon you to continue and consolidate the reforms of our working methods into what we hope will be a format or organization more in line with the demands of this new stage of the work in the field of disarmament and international security.

We shall limit the length of this statement in accordance with the suggestions made last year by your predecessor, Ambassador Adolf von Wagner of Germany, whose tenacious efforts to rationalize our work have already borne fruit. A shortened general debate will allow us to devote the time saved to a livelier and less formal discussion of the items allocated to us.

We must reduce further the number of resolutions of this Committee and thus continue to improve and prune its agenda without affecting the disarmament priorities on which we have all agreed.

This Committee has the task of establishing guidelines to ensure significant progress in the field of disarmament. Despite the many positive changes, the international scene remains uncertain and there is the risk that unforeseen events may change the present course of multilateral relations. We must therefore quicken the pace of the work and lay solid foundations for negotiations over the coming years, but we shall not achieve this if we remain tied to military doctrines of the past or if we seek to create new areas of tension.

The end of the cold war has signified, among many other things, an opportunity to engage in truly multilateral dialogue, vastly different from that which characterized the bipolar world. Such dialogue is much more democratic and thus much more complicated. We should ensure its success by achieving disarmament measures and by consolidating it through the enlargement of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament under the terms on which agreement was almost reached in 1993.

This Committee should focus its attention on all aspects of the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery. For several years, my delegation has been advocating a frank and constructive dialogue on this issue, both here and in the Conference on Disarmament. Hence our informal consultations at Geneva and our proposal last year, which became resolution 48/75 C, in which the Secretary-General was requested "to prepare a short report containing a brief description" of this question "and to transmit it, no later than 1 May 1994, to a representative intergovernmental group of experts for its consideration and suggestions regarding further study of the question by the international community in various multilateral disarmament forums".

When introducing that text to the Committee we suggested that the intergovernmental group could be the Conference on Disarmament, but the report of the Secretary-General (A/INF/49/3) was distributed only on 20 May and was never submitted to a group of experts. The document which the Secretary-General has sent to us is

therefore incomplete. We regret this and await the explanations which the Secretariat will surely provide us with here.

Mexico's interest in the various aspects of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was apparent over thirty years ago when Mexico successfully led the negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). This year, with the important steps taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the announcement made by Cuba and the signature of Saint Kitts and Nevis, the instrument is about to come into full force and for this we may congratulate ourselves.

Mexico is also a party to the biological weapons Convention and is ready to contribute to the identification and drafting of measures, including those on verification and confidence-building, that will ensure full compliance with its provisions. Moreover, we were the first country in this hemisphere to ratify the chemical weapons Convention. During this half of the year, we are also chairing the Preparatory Committee for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In that capacity, we make a polite and friendly call to signatory States to speed up their respective ratification processes. That will help to increase the rhythm of the work in The Hague.

Mexico is participating actively in the preparation of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). From the beginning we insisted that the preparatory process should cover, in addition to the organizational aspects, the substantive questions regarding the five-year review of the operation of the Treaty and its eventual extension. It was not until its third and penultimate session, held this past September, that the Preparatory Committee finally took up the substantive issues. The exchange of views was useful since it allowed us a glimpse of the different approaches to convening the Conference to be held in just six months.

It is obvious that the States parties to the NPT want a more secure world and a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime. But it is also clear that it will be difficult to move in that direction without the determined contribution of all. States with nuclear weapons should announce a series of nuclear disarmament measures and implement them within a specific time-frame. But the States that do not have nuclear weapons must also take concrete steps to avoid the perception, real or imagined, that they are not complying with all the provisions of the NPT. We must all show good faith.

In this regard what can a country such as mine do to strengthen the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons regimes? According to a few countries, nuclear weapons are not intrinsically bad: it all depends on who has them. To a handful of others, nuclear weapons are not an end in themselves, but rather a means to achieve a reasonable degree of national security. However, the most widely held opinion on nuclear weapons is that they represent a threat that must be totally eliminated. Together with other delegations we are exploring the possibility of submitting for consideration by this Committee a proposal aimed at reducing that threat step by step.

There are those who wish to extend the NPT indefinitely and unconditionally and preferably without discussion. The idea seems to be "sign now and talk later". Any contract or agreement must be read carefully before being signed. Some of us would like to sign a blank cheque regarding the future development of nuclear arsenals: it is a very unusual procedure.

For many countries the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) is highly desirable as a means to ensure the success of the 1995 NPT Conference. In January of this year the Conference on Disarmament began negotiations which it is my honour to chair. The report which the Conference on Disarmament has submitted in this regard reflects the progress already achieved but it also reveals, in the appendix containing the rolling text of the treaty, that much still remains to be done. Hence the decision to reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee in November at the end of the First Committee's session. As was done during the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention, we would be ready to take part in an informal meeting to inform the Committee on how the work in Geneva is proceeding.

The main outstanding issues are of fundamental importance: the scope of the prohibition and its verification system. The two are closely interrelated and require a prompt political decision if we are to bring the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.

Speaking as the representative of Mexico, I consider the results achieved thus far as significant but insufficient. We feel that we might perhaps have been able to make greater progress this year and even conclude the negotiations. In truth, the problem is not as complicated as some imagine: suffice it to consider who wants to carry out nuclear tests.

In each of the nuclear-weapon States there are undoubtedly those who would like to continue testing. In two of those countries, the United States and the Russian Federation, the decision has already been taken to suspend testing and to turn the ban into a permanent one through a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Another country cannot test as long as the United States maintains its unilateral moratorium. In a fourth country, a suspension has been decreed at the presidential level, and the fifth — the only one that has continued testing in recent years — is committed to achieving a CTBT no later than 1996. As far as we know there is no other country in the world that is thinking of beginning a nuclear-testing programme. It is true that a sixth country carried out a nuclear test in 1974, but the experience of the last two decades confirms that it has no intention of repeating it.

The foregoing is proof that a CTBT will affect the national- defence programmes of very few countries. It also demonstrates that there are important differences in their respective levels of nuclear development. In fact, it would seem that there are three that wish to achieve the levels of the two main nuclear Powers. At the same time, they all insist on the need to deny others access to their club. This results in not very convincing attempts to justify the possession of such weapons of mass destruction and to continue developing them.

The prompt conclusion of a CTBT would have a very favourable political impact on the future of the NPT. If the work in Geneva were to stagnate, we might take advantage of the other path open to us, the Amendment Conference of the partial test-ban Treaty. But we must also make progress in the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on negative security assurances. Moreover, the establishment of a committee on the drafting of a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material is still pending in the Conference on Disarmament. The latter question, which seemed to be resolved in the light of last year's resolution has become more complicated in 1994 as several aspects have become clearer. It has been proposed that the problem of the material already stockpiled and of plutonium in highly-enriched uranium for civilian purposes be considered. Here, as in other nuclear disarmament matters, it will be necessary to convince the international community of the value of turning a series of unilateral decisions into a multilateral treaty.

**Mr. Hoffmann** (Germany): On behalf of the European Union and of Austria, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Bureau most warmly on your election. I have no doubt that under your competent guidance the work of the First Committee will be carried out successfully. The European Union wishes to pledge its unreserved support in assisting with the fulfilment of your important and not always easy task.

The ideological division of the world, a source of deep mistrust and constant tension, has come to an end. Nevertheless, there remain great risks to peace and security in the world. I refer to the growing number of regional and internal conflicts, which have dreadful consequences for the people concerned, and to the dangers caused by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons.

The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are a tragic example of the bloody excesses to which exaggerated nationalism can lead. The European Union has from the beginning been involved in the quest for a peaceful and lasting solution. With the United Nations we share the chairmanship of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and play a major role in the efforts of the Contact Group. A large number of soldiers from countries of the European Union are doing a tremendous job in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Through the European Union monitoring mission we are contributing to the prevention and defusing of conflict situations and to the rebuilding of trust between the parties to the conflict. With the support of the Western European Union, we are also participating in the monitoring and implementation of the embargo and, with the European Union administration in Mostar, wish to give a signal for the reconciliation of the ethnic groups living in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. But we have to think beyond immediate measures geared towards a political settlement. Any future peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia needs to be complemented by an arms control process bolstering a peace settlement by stabilizing the situation, building confidence and preventing a renewed outbreak of armed conflict.

While the situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to cause concern, the peace process in the Middle East has progressed further in the last few months. This applies particularly to Israeli-Palestinian as well as Israeli-Jordanian relations. The signing of the Gaza and Jericho Agreement on 4 May 1994 in Cairo, which opened the way for Palestinian autonomy, represents a notable success both for the Israeli Government and for the Palestine Liberation Organization. The political leaders of both sides deserve respect and recognition for their far-sightedness and courage. In the same vein, the European Union welcomes

the Washington Declaration of 25 July 1994, signed by King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel. It represents another important breakthrough in the Middle East peace process.

We confirm our readiness to help ensure that the current momentum in the Middle East peace process is used to bring about further concrete progress and agreements. We feel that confidence-building measures form part of this process. We expect the new climate of reconciliation and of willingness to negotiate also to be reflected in the resolutions of this year's General Assembly.

After the end of East-West confrontation, arms control and disarmament continue to be of prime political importance. New sources and regions of tension have heightened concern about the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

It is against this background that the European Union is deeply concerned about the events on the Korean peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has so far failed to eliminate doubts concerning the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration of nuclear materials and committed numerous violations of the safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It continues to be in non-compliance with its obligations under both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards regime. We therefore urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with these obligations. At the same time we support efforts to contribute to a reduction in tension on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and we hope that such efforts will contribute to a solution of the nuclear issue which accords fully with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The non-proliferation Treaty continues to be the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation system. The strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime through the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty lies in the security interest of all States. Furthermore, this extension is the basis for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are therefore committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. The European Union has recently — in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — launched a joint action on the preparation for the 1995 review and extension Conference.

We welcome the recent advances towards universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, in particular the accession of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, taking the number of its States parties to 165. We appeal to those States still outside the non-proliferation Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States and to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA. With regard to Ukraine we welcome the withdrawal of a substantial number of nuclear warheads to Russia. This constitutes effective disarmament on the basis of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I). We look forward to the accession of Ukraine to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State at the earliest possible time, in accordance with the trilateral statement of 14 January 1994, with the Lisbon Protocol and with other previous agreements.

The European Union welcomes the substantial progress made in the Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Our objective is to negotiate as a priority task and to conclude an effective, verifiable, multilateral and universally applicable comprehensive test-ban treaty which genuinely contributes to non-proliferation and disarmament.

The commitment of all States to participate seriously in the negotiations should lead to concrete results. It is encouraging in particular that the outline of a future treaty and its verification regime is taking shape. We are happy that members of the European Union have been able to play a major role in this regard. The European Union is supportive of the statements of France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States about the suspension of nuclear tests and is convinced that exercise of the utmost restraint in respect of nuclear testing would be consistent with the objective of international negotiation of a comprehensive test ban.

The European Union would welcome the initiation of negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices — a cut-off treaty — in accordance with General Assembly resolution 48/75 L. We hope that at its next session the Conference on Disarmament will set up an ad hoc committee for this purpose.

As important supplier countries of nuclear technology and members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, we call on the other supplier countries to apply the IAEA full-scope safeguards requirements as a condition for supply and we urge all countries concerned to conclude full-scope

safeguards agreements. We appeal to all States which have not yet done so to participate in the voluntary reporting system of the IAEA on nuclear transfers as an additional contribution to strengthening the safeguards system.

Nuclear disarmament remains one of the highest priorities of the European Union in the field of arms control and disarmament. In this context, we attach particular importance to the implementation of existing disarmament agreements and commitments. To that effect we shall continue to cooperate with Russia and other successor States of the former Soviet Union in the difficult task of speeding up the process of elimination of their nuclear weapons in compliance with agreements concluded and commitments taken.

We note with satisfaction that the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow, of which the European Union is a founding member, has started its operations. We expect that it will contribute substantially to the creation of civil career opportunities for scientists and engineers coming from the former Soviet Union who were previously employed in the military sector.

The European Union supports the strengthening of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons by the addition of an effective verification regime. Such a regime should help to promote the European Union's aim of wider adherence to that Convention.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, now signed by 157 States and ratified by 14, represents one of the most significant and innovative disarmament agreements of the last decade. Through early ratification and careful preparation of their national measures for its implementation, signatory States should do everything in their power to ensure that this disarmament Treaty, which has taken so much time and effort to negotiate, will soon enter into force and display its full benefits. The prospect of imminent entry into force would give fresh impetus to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Hague. Experts and working groups have found practical solutions to numerous problems, although many others remain unresolved. These should be settled as soon as possible.

Together with other like-minded countries we are already controlling exports of chemical-weapons-related substances and technology. In our opinion these controls are in full accord with the letter and spirit of the chemical weapons Convention, and they will contribute to ensuring that the goals of the chemical weapons Convention are attained. We undertake to review these controls in the light of the implementation of the Convention, for the benefit of States parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention.

We consider the Missile Technology Control Regime to be an effective and useful instrument for preventing the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. We support a strengthening of that Regime and appeal to all States which have not yet done so to adhere to its guidelines on a voluntary basis.

The United Nations can look back on a successful year in eliminating Iraq's potential for weapons of mass destruction in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The Special Commission entrusted with the taskhas succeeded, with considerable support from European Union member States, in largely neutralizing Iraq's prohibited arms programmes. We look forward to the introduction of a long-term verification system, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and accepted by the Iraqi Government in 1993. The United Nations is thereby making an important contribution to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. This action will need to be followed by further steps.

The European Union is convinced that transparency in armaments is an important factor in the creation of a climate of trust between States, particularly at the regional level. In this regard, we can look back on a very successful experience within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). On a global level, we therefore attach major importance to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The implementation of the Register so far is encouraging, but is not entirely satisfactory. In the first year of its existence, 90 States, including all member States of the European Union, made declarations to the United Nations Register. We hope for higher figures in the future and appeal to all States which have not yet made declarations to contribute to the widest possible participation in the Register. This also applies to States which have no exports or imports to declare, since even a nil return represents an important contribution to greater transparency in the field of worldwide arms transfers. The European Union supports the work that has been achieved on transparency in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, and

considers it necessary that this topic should remain on the agenda of the Conference.

The European Union welcomes the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the Register. The European Union notes with regret that, although the New York Group reaffirmed the goal of early expansion of the Register by the inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production, it could not at this juncture reach consensus on such inclusion at the same level as for transfers. The European Union and its member States express their continued support for the further development of the Register and emphasize the importance of including data on military holdings and procurement through national production to make the Register comprehensive and capable of attracting the widest possible participation. We therefore consider it necessary that the functioning and further development of the Register should be reviewed in 1996, by a new group of governmental experts, with a view to its early expansion. The European Union urges all States Members of the United Nations to cooperate to this end.

The European Union considers transparency and responsibility regarding the transfer of arms and dual-use goods and technologies to be important in the promotion of peace and international security. The European Union is about to adopt a reinforced system of control of dual-use items. Together with other countries, we are pressing for effective export controls.

Regional arrangements within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter can make an essential contribution to strengthening security. The CSCE is a good illustration of this. The Security Forum, a body for negotiation and dialogue, brings all the CSCE member States into the discussions on conventional arms control, the behaviour of States in their security relations, and regional security and non-proliferation matters. We welcome the adoption by the Security Forum on 25 November 1993 of four texts on military cooperation and contacts, defence planning, regional stabilization measures in times of crisis, and the principles governing conventional arms transfers. With a view to the CSCE summit to be held in Budapest on 5 and 6 December 1994, we hope that the Security Forum will be able to adopt, *inter alia*, a code of conduct for States in their security relations which is concise and operational and centred on politico-military questions, based on the European Union proposal of 30 June 1993, and a clear commitment by all CSCE member States to achieve harmonization of the conventional disarmament agreements in Europe and a mandate enabling the Forum to continue to negotiate in this area after the Budapest meeting.

Our experience in adopting the principles governing conventional arms transfers in the CSCE has encouraged us to think there would be value in the adoption of similar principles on a global basis, with a view to promoting responsibility in conventional arms transfers. The dangers of instability in many parts of the world are increasing and there has been a growing recognition of the need to promote greater restraint and responsibility in transfers of conventional weapons. It should be understood that such a measure on conventional arms transfers should take into account the purposes and principles of the United Nations set forth in the Charter, including the right of States to acquire arms to exercise their inherent right to self-defence. In this context, the European Union, together with some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, intends to submit a draft resolution concerning a code of conduct for conventional arms transfers.

Regional confidence-building and disarmament are also gaining momentum in other regions of the world. The European Union particularly welcomes the fact that Argentina, Chile and Brazil have now ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco with its amendments and deposited the necessary instruments for the immediate entry into force of the Treaty on their territory. We also note the progress achieved in drafting the treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. We also welcome the discussion on regional disarmament and confidence-building efforts in the framework of the newly-established regional forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. The European Union supports non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in South Asia.

Bearing in mind the guidelines and recommendations on regional disarmament adopted at the 1993 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the European Union is looking forward to further initiatives in the field of regional disarmament and confidence-building.

Every day, throughout the world, civilians, including children, are maimed and killed by land-mines which make whole tracts of land uninhabitable as a consequence of armed conflicts. The European Union therefore welcomes the progress made at the Geneva expert discussions on a new version of Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. We appeal to all States to participate in the Review Conference

planned for September/October 1995. We welcome the decision of several States, including mine-producing States, to impose export moratoria for anti-personnel mines, and commit ourselves to working against the uncontrolled proliferation of land-mines worldwide. In the context of the follow-up of resolution 48/7, entitled "Assistance in mine clearance", we welcome the establishment of a United Nations voluntary trust fund to assist, especially in information and training programmes relating to mine clearance, and to facilitate the launching of mine-clearance operations.

In the context of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, members of the European Union are greatly concerned at the development of new conventional-weapons systems and are prepared to study proposals governing them.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which provides for the elimination of roughly 50,000 conventional-weapons systems by 1995, is a cornerstone of the European security architecture and a successful example of regional disarmament. The European Union is committed to full implementation of the Treaty and considers that the Budapest CSCE summit should aim at reaffirming this commitment. The full implementation of this Treaty will enable the CSCE to make further progress in the field of arms control.

We also attach great importance to the Treaty on Open Skies, which in our view represents a unique confidence-building measure. We will continue to work for its early entry into force.

The new international climate is both an opportunity and a challenge. It is also a challenge to our readiness to organize appropriate discussions of, and practical approaches to, the disarmament and security problems of the present and the future. In this context, we attach overriding importance to a significant expansion of the membership of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, in particular at a time when substantial negotiations are taking place on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. We regret that it has not yet been possible to reach a consensus on such an expansion in the Disarmament Conference. The States members of the European Union will be tireless in their efforts to achieve their objective of a significant expansion. The Union is of the opinion that the most practical solution would be for all countries which have applied to date to be accepted without delay.

At its forty-eighth session the General Assembly adopted unanimously a resolution on the rationalization of the work of the First Committee which was based on an initiative of the European Union. On 14 September, this resolution was complemented by a General Assembly decision on the organization of the work of the First Committee. We shall support you, Mr. Chairman, to the best of our abilities in your efforts to give effect to both the resolution and the decision during the current session of the First Committee. In doing so, we wish to help seize the opportunity I spoke of to reduce tensions and find solutions to conflicts, so that our world can become a more peaceful and secure place.

**Mr. Starr** (Australia): May I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation looks forward to cooperating with you and to working under your wise guidance towards the achievement of the Committee's common goals. Our congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau.

The most remarkable human imprint on this planet visible to the human eye from outer space is said to be the Great Wall of China. It is stark evidence of that most basic and powerful human imperative, the urge to join together in the building of defensive structures to protect our peace and secure development — in short, to build for peace.

As we embark again on our annual deliberations in the First Committee, let me assure members that my delegation approaches our arms control, disarmament and international security agenda drawing on the same profound motivation. What occupies us here is our common striving towards international laws, norms, agreements and arrangements designed to minimize threats to our security, to promote confidence and mutual trust and to create frameworks for ongoing dialogue and cooperation, for these are our building blocks, the vital multilateral components of our collective peace-building.

Ever since their invention some 50 years ago, nuclear weapons and their proliferation have proved to be one of the most fundamental security issues. The very best minds of our age have laboured long and hard to deal with the military, political and moral conundrums they have raised and to set in place legal and political norms pointing in the direction of a world which will at some stage be purged of nuclear weapons.

In recent years, there have been dramatic and far-reaching, indeed historic, steps to reverse the nuclear arms race. This profound improvement must be counted, but at this meeting I will focus on a review of the current status of the global multilateral components of nuclear security as it applies to us all.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has proved itself to be, and remains, the single most effective global security regime in force today. Over the last quarter of a century, it has provided the international community with its front line of defence against the spread of nuclear weapons and with a secure foundation for both international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear commerce. The Treaty has thus made a vital contribution to international security, nuclear trade and nuclear cooperation.

The non-proliferation Treaty incorporates the only commitment from the five nuclear-weapon States to complete nuclear disarmament. With the removal of the obstacles posed by the cold war, impressive and tangible progress is being achieved. Next year's review Conference gives us the opportunity to secure the Treaty's benefits in perpetuity. The Australian Government firmly believes that this is an opportunity we must grasp decisively if we are to shape a world in which our collective commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and to a world free of nuclear weapons can be realized. Indefinite extension of the Treaty will create an environment in which the pressures for continued nuclear disarmament will be maximized, in which nuclear proliferation can be prevented, in which trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be maintained, and in which the goal of universal acceptance of the norms set out in the Treaty can best be achieved.

Many States parties have therefore, like Australia, publicly committed themselves to seeking such an extension and have reflected this in their general debate statements to the plenary Assembly. In our own region, we welcomed and joined with the South Pacific Forum's endorsement of this objective at its annual meeting in Brisbane.

We will be looking to the 1995 Conference for all States parties freely and sincerely to reaffirm their indefinite commitment to the Treaty and to its effective and unconditional implementation in all aspects. For Australia, that implies an undiluted, ungrudging and effective commitment to the principles of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as spelt out in the Treaty. We are demonstrably as committed to the indefinite extension and enhanced implementation of articles IV and VI as we are to the nuclear non-proliferation obligations contained in articles I, II and III. The 1995 Conference will give us the opportunity to strengthen the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty, undertaking the practical refurbishment needed to keep its mechanisms effective and its defences against nuclear proliferation relevant.

We welcome the steady accession of new members, emphasizing that now only a handful of countries remain outside the Treaty. In parallel, Australia welcomes the recent announcements by Cuba of its intention to accede to and bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thus solidifying the deep commitment of the Latin American region to nuclear non-proliferation. We similarly welcome the sustained and impressive efforts of African countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty for the African region.

We warmly commend the example of those who acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the past year and call upon those still finalizing their accession or with safeguards agreements still outstanding to conclude these expeditiously.

We remain deeply concerned that, on the eve of the 1995 Conference, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains in non-compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations, despite the best efforts of the Agency and of the international community to rectify the situation. We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respect and fully implement the solemn nuclear non-proliferation undertakings to which it freely subscribed. We look to the General Assembly to provide an unequivocal indication of the international community's support for the IAEA in its impartial application of the verification measures accepted by all States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and of its firm expectation of a speedy return to compliance.

Australia is delighted that, spurred on by last year's historic consensus resolution on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), the Conference on Disarmament commenced negotiations promptly in 1994 and has been able to pass to this Committee a rolling text representing substantial and intensive work. The text is comprehensive in scope. This is a positive outcome for some 26 weeks of negotiation, and we acknowledge the active and positive contributions made to the negotiation by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

That being said, it is clear that important work remains to be done. For its part, while setting no deadlines, Australia seeks the production in early 1995 of a text that, though it may still be short of final completion, is nevertheless comprehensive in scope and coherent in structure, and that is credibly close to conclusion. We think that, in order to be credible, the text should by that stage reflect and incorporate substantial political closure on the major issues and demonstrate a clear commitment on the part of all negotiators to maintain negotiations towards a timely conclusion in the near future.

In endorsing and encouraging an intensified negotiating effort, my delegation will be pleased once again to join with the delegations of Mexico and New Zealand in promoting the resolution, in which we hope this Committee will make clear the high priority that the entire international community accords to the negotiations. We are not advocating a hasty, careless or superficial approach to these negotiations, but a deliberate, orderly and concerted effort to close the remaining gaps in our endeavours. It would be unforgivable for us to fritter away the opportunity that the end of the cold war, the consensus to ban testing and the restraint in testing demonstrated by most nuclear-weapon States has afforded us to achieve the long- sought-after disarmament and non-proliferation benefits of a comprehensive test ban.

In this context, Australia has expressed particular disappointment over continued Chinese testing, which has been condemned by Australian ministers. Australia is absolutely opposed to nuclear testing and the participation in the nuclear-arms race that this necessarily implies. We consider it essential that the utmost restraint in testing be exercised by the nuclear-weapon States as negotiations reach a critical stage in 1995. China's continued testing is out of step with the positive atmosphere of the negotiations and does not easily coincide with its own principled support for nuclear disarmament or with its commitment to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty by 1996.

Security assurances — both positive and negative — remain relevant in a post-cold war world where nuclear weapons remain a fact of life and where doctrines on the use of nuclear weapons are under renewed scrutiny. The nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to exercise leadership and to provide a credible response to the reasonable expectations of the international community, the vast majority of which have already provided nuclear non-aggression assurances by way of non-proliferation Treaty and comparable non-proliferation undertakings. My delegation considers that this responsibility requires the development of a security assurances arrangement that is binding and that represents a significant "value-added" advance on the existing unilateral assurances.

We think that a Security Council resolution could be crafted so as to set in place a new and universal legal rule prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or to comparable multilateral non-proliferation undertakings and that are in compliance with the full-scope nuclear safeguards that verify these undertakings. Such a resolution, once passed, would take immediate and universal effect and could have an international legal status comparable to a multilateral treaty, if drafted so as to reflect an intention to bind Security Council members and other United Nations Members, drawing on the Council's authority as granted by the United Nations Charter. The resolution could provide updated and more explicit positive security assurances, recognizing the importance to certain regions of confidence that the Security Council, especially its permanent members, will act decisively in the event of nuclear aggression or threats of such aggression. In the Pacific region, these steps could be usefully complemented by accession by all nuclear-weapon States to the relevant protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga, in line with assurances given in similar circumstances to other regions.

My delegation was greatly encouraged by our common achievement, at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, of consensus — for the first time — on the need to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Capping the further production for explosive purposes of fissile material — the essential raw material for building nuclear weapons — is a disarmament objective that Australia has supported over many years. Putting such a cap in place will limit the scope of any future resumption of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and of nuclear proliferation. It would enable the nuclear-weapon States and those few States not applying full-scope nuclear safeguards to join with verified commitments already subscribed to and applied by the vast majority of the international community.

The end of the cold war and the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to call a halt to one of the fundamental mechanics of nuclear proliferation have finally placed cut-off within our grasp. We have therefore found it doubly disappointing that one or two non-nuclear-weapon States have so far found it impossible to commit themselves

to the negotiations that the entire international community called for last autumn on a basis that was careful not to prejudice the position of any State. We trust that this Committee will give a renewed indication of its seriousness of purpose on the matter and an endorsement of the necessary consensus approach.

The effort to secure the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction is progressing and should continue to receive the strongest international support. Australia welcomes the continuing good pace of work in The Hague to implement the chemical weapons Convention and the increasing number of ratifications now to hand as States parties complete the domestic preparations required for them to discharge their international obligations. Expert groups are dealing methodically with the host of technical detail that implementation of the Convention entails, and we are pleased to note that institution-building is proceeding satisfactorily.

Australia deposited its instrument of ratification for the Convention in May 1994. My delegation would urge other States signatory to the Convention to proceed expeditiously towards ratification and implementation, in particular those States that are still possessors of chemical weapons. We look to the United States and Russia to provide the same committed leadership in this as they displayed during the negotiations, recognizing the relevance, to implementation of the chemical weapons Convention, of their bilateral arrangements for chemical weapons destruction. Australia looks forward to the early entry into force of the Convention to enable the international community's expressed wish for chemical disarmament to be achieved, enhancing global security. Effective implementation of the Convention should help to facilitate trade and development in the chemical field, a key interest Australia shares with other prospective States parties to the Convention.

The recent, highly publicized outbreak of pneumonic plague in India has dramatically highlighted the degree to which our interconnected global community — and in particular the developing countries — remains open to the ravages of naturally occurring contagious diseases. Even more horrifying is the spectre of biological weapons. This spectre will remain with us as long as the biological weapons Convention of 1972 remains without a credible and effective verification regime.

The Special Conference of the States Parties to the biological weapons convention concluded by agreeing on a mandate for ongoing work that will permit the negotiation of legally binding compliance and verification arrangements capable of closing this gap. Unfortunately, agreement was not easily secured. The lesson was clear: we shall have to work hard to strengthen and focus the international political resolve that is needed if we are to address the challenge of biological weapons more effectively. As we stand poised to enter a new century, it is incumbent on us to strive to ensure that this particular Pandora's box of evil does not threaten our common future any longer.

Transparency in armaments is a key element in efforts to reduce mistrust and miscalculation in the security environment, and an important component of cooperative security as advocated by the Foreign Minister of Australia. An important step towards increased transparency was achieved through the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. While Australia regrets that the recent expert group was unable to reach consensus to expand the Register beyond transfers, it is important to strengthen this initial international exercise in transparency of conventional weaponry by seeking to ensure universal participation.

In this area of transparency more than most, regional efforts complement global measures. They constitute an important means of addressing the specific regional security context. The Asia-Pacific region has taken an important step forward this year in relation to cooperative security with the inaugural meeting of the Association of South-East Asian Nations Regional Forum, held in Bangkok on 25 July. Included in the proposals for further study before the second meeting in 1995 are a number of defence-related confidence-building measures, many of which are premised on the principle of transparency and all of which are tailored to the specific requirements of the region.

Important work was commenced this year in the group of experts on the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. Australia advocates that Protocol II of that Convention, which deals with land-mines, should apply to non-international as well as to international conflicts. In Australia's view, mines should not be exported to States that are not party to Protocol II. We believe it is also vital that in future, anti-personnel mines should be detectable and incorporate a self-destruct mechanism to ensure that mines do not remain unexploded at the end of hostilities, threatening the lives and livelihood of the civilian population. These are useful protections for armed forces as well, and should apply whether the mine is remotely delivered or manually placed.

We must seek feasible but direct solutions to the horror of the literally millions of mines left in countries such as Cambodia, Afghanistan and Mozambique. Australia has provided mine-clearance teams in all three of these countries, but in the longer term we believe the only solution is the broad establishment of international standards along the practical and achievable lines we advocate.

There is a great need for action on land-mines, and the real concern of States and peoples provides an opportunity to strengthen the Convention and widen adherence. My Government urges all States that have not done so to accede to or ratify the Convention and to participate in this work.

Finally, let me say that we are disappointed that the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament remains unresolved despite the significant amount of energy and creativity that has been put into finding a solution to this issue. As on issues of substance, the Conference must respond to the expectations of the international community regarding enhancement of the representativeness of the Conference through expanded membership. In the meantime, we welcome the active engagement of non-member States in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

**Mr. Steward** (South Africa): It is a particular privilege, in view of an enforced absence from the Committee for many years, to be able today to offer my congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to your responsible office, and also to congratulate the Vice-Chairmen, from Austria and Japan, respectively. My delegation is well aware of the degree of dedication and expertise required to steer the deliberations of this Committee in a constructive direction in the interest of disarmament and world peace. My delegation offers its full cooperation and feels that in the light of the special circumstances obtaining, the Committee may be interested in the positions of the South African Government on the items now under consideration.

South Africa's Government of National Unity has committed itself to a policy of non-proliferation and arms control that covers all the weapons of mass destruction and extends to our concerns about the proliferation of conventional weapons. To implement this policy, South Africa is in the process of taking numerous substantive steps. It is our intention to be a responsible possessor of advanced technologies.

We are gratified that our position in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been normalized, and we look forward to serving constructively on the Board of Governors.

South Africa became a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1991 and concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA shortly thereafter. We became a member of the Zangger Committee in 1993. At that time we began to participate in the work of the Group of Experts designated by the United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization for African Unity, to finalize the drafting of a treaty or convention on the denuclearization of Africa. We wholeheartedly support the work of the Group of Experts, and the draft they have produced.

In this regard, I am happy to be in a position to offer, for consideration by the Committee and the authorities concerned, the designation of South Africa as the seat of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy once it is established.

South Africa is in favour of universal membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and calls on all States that have not joined the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible time. South Africa, in its position as the first country to have unilaterally and voluntarily dismantled an existing nuclear weapons programme, would specifically direct this appeal to the so-called "threshold" States, among which South Africa once was numbered. South Africa's experience has shown that a policy of complete transparency holds many benefits and, in fact, increases a country's security.

In 1993 South Africa also became a signatory to the chemical weapons Convention. We recently hosted an African regional seminar on national implementation of the Convention, at which representatives of 39 African States were present.

We are a State party to the biological weapons Convention. During 1993, South Africa for the first time submitted to the Secretary-General a report on confidence-building measures and it is preparing a more detailed declaration. While work is under way to develop a system of confidence-building measures for this Convention, we would call on all States to participate in the United Nations confidence-building measures. Our experts participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on verification (VEREX), and we were one of the countries that called for the convening of a special conference of

States parties to the Convention to be convened in 1995 to consider the measures adopted by VEREX. South Africa will continue to participate in this endeavour.

Our concerns also extend to the proliferation of conventional weapons. South Africa, in common with most Member States, has noted with abhorrence the terrible effects on civilian populations of the use of land-mines. In response to the call of the United Nations for States to impose a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines, we have declared an indefinite moratorium on the international marketing, transfer and export of all types of mines. I believe that this places South Africa in the vanguard in the world in this area.

I am also pleased to place on record that the South African Cabinet recently decided that South Africa should become a party to the Convention on Prohibition and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.

South Africa looks forward to the resolution of the last remaining problem to the enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament. This would enable South Africa, and others, to play the useful role we believe we are able to play.

By committing themselves fully to achieving disarmament and non-proliferation on a universal scale, the nations of the world can contribute to ending the scourge of war and the allocation of vast resources to weaponry that could be better used for the development of our world and the upliftment of our people, addressing what is perhaps the foremost human right.

**The Chairman:** I call next upon the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to introduce the report of the Commission (A/49/42).

**Mr. Mongbe** (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): I wish first of all, Sir, to congratulate you on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. I am certain that your talent and commitment will bring us success in our work. My congratulations go also to the other Committee officers.

I cannot fail to pay tribute to last year's Chairman, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany, who directed our work at the forty-eighth session with such ability and deftness and who worked so hard on the rationalization of the work of the Committee.

It is my honour to introduce the 1994 report of the Disarmament Commission, of which I am the Chairman. The report (A/49/42) includes the conclusions reached at the Commission's organizational session and at its substantive session held at United Nations Headquarters between 18 April and 9 May 1994.

The agenda for the Commission's 1994 substantive session contained three items that were first the subject of a general exchange of views in plenary meeting and then of in-depth discussion in three working groups. The first item was "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons"; it was considered by Working Group I, chaired by Ambassador Volodymyr D. Khandogy of Ukraine. The second was "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields"; it was considered by Working Group II, chaired by Ambassador Peggy Mason of Canada. The third item was "International arms transfers"; it was discussed in Working Group III under the chairmanship of Ambassador Luis Fernando Jaramillo of Colombia.

I shall summarize the results of these intensive deliberations in the Commission. The Disarmament Commission was unable to conclude its work on the item on nuclear disarmament. Consideration of the item was to have been concluded this year, but on the recommendation of Working Group I it will be included once again on the Commission's agenda, not only because of its complexity but also because of the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on aspects of nuclear disarmament and the review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Working Group II concluded its work on the role of science and technology, but did not reach consensus on a text setting out guidelines and recommendations owing to disagreement on the paragraph dealing with the transfer for peaceful purposes of high technology with dual — military and civilian — applications, within the context of existing agreements that should enjoy the broadest possible adherence. It is important to note that this disagreement arose because of differing views on the non-proliferation Treaty: perfect in the eyes of some, discriminatory in the eyes of others. It was therefore decided that the Commission would cease its consideration of this item, which was in its fourth year of deliberations.

As agreed at the organizational session, when it was included on the agenda, the item on international arms

transfers was kept strictly within the framework of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H, which stated the view that settlement of this problem would contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the diminishing of tensions, thereby promoting disarmament and socio-economic development. But owing to the breadth of this subject, there were still differences on the approach that should be adopted. Some delegations felt that discussion could be confined to illicit transfers, which might be defined as trade in arms that evades the control of national and international authorities. Others, on the other hand, wanted all aspects of the matter to be taken up, with particular emphasis on illicit trafficking, on the understanding that some aspects of this matter are now under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament and by the group of experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons. Still others felt that all aspects of the matter should be covered with a view to laying the groundwork for control of all classes of these weapons which are responsible for such suffering.

A working paper submitted by the Chairman of Working Group III is annexed to the report of the Commission. It is based on the preliminary views of delegations, and is not binding, but it could serve as a basis for future deliberations. The working paper suggests: that controlling the illicit transfer of weapons and military equipment of all kinds relates to the acquisition of arms by unauthorized persons as well as to exploitation and delivery; that strengthening international cooperation, especially in the framework of the United Nations, is necessary to that end; and that we must consider, for example, setting up a computerized systematic registry of missing or stolen weapons with a view to dealing quickly with anyone who tries to register or sell them.

Despite the considerable cerebrations of delegations, the 1994 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, whose work is based on consensus, did not achieve the expected guidelines and recommendations on agenda items 1 and 2. Some delegations, disappointed but not discouraged, suggested abandoning the principle of consensus. Delegations in general are clear that the Commission is an important specialized deliberative body within the multilateral disarmament machinery, and hope that the Commission will be able with political will by all members to achieve substantive results on the items before it, which are important for world peace and security.

In the context of the normal activities of the Commission, it is already time — before the December 1994 organizational session — to think not only about the Bureau for 1995, whose chairmanship will go to the Group of Asian States, but also about the new agenda item for the 1995 substantive session. Without prejudging our choice of the new item, I should like to recall that in resolution 47/54 A the Assembly noted the support for the proposal to include an item entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction".

Another relevant item that might be worthy of attention would relate to implementation of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade. As we are already half way through the Decade, consideration of such an item in 1995 would enable us to set our priorities for multilateral disarmament for the next five years.

Members of the Bureau of the Disarmament Commission will soon submit a draft resolution on the report of the Commission to the General Assembly, and would welcome any comments or suggestions that might facilitate its adoption by consensus.

I would like to reiterate my conviction that by identifying points and measures of common interest we can truly guarantee the security of all. This includes the field of disarmament, which is a political process that moves forward by means of negotiation and persuasion.

In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to all those who have in one way or another worked to ensure the smooth functioning of the Commission during my term of office. In particular I would like to thank all delegations for their willingness to cooperate, my colleagues on the Bureau for always being available, the Chairmen of the Working Groups for their determination, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, under the dynamic leadership of Mr. Davinic, for its efficiency, the secretariat of the Commission, under the skilled leadership of my friend Mr. Lin, for its dedication, and the Conference Services staff for its patience and stamina.

**Mr. Valle** (Brazil): At the outset I wish to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, the warmest congratulations of the Brazilian delegation on your election. It is a matter of special satisfaction for us to see such a qualified and skilful diplomat from the sister nation of Ecuador in charge of our work in this important Committee of the General Assembly. I also wish to take this opportunity to express our congratulations to the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur and to offer our collaboration to all.

As we approach half a century of United Nations activity in the promotion of peace and international security, we are convinced that the First Committee retains a fundamental role as a universal, multilateral forum for the consideration of some of the most pressing issues of our time. As new opportunities for increased solidarity among nations are afforded by history, we must assume a stronger commitment to attain the results that have eluded us for many decades in the field of disarmament.

As a country situated in one of the most disarmed regions of the world, Brazil stands ready to contribute to new, determined international efforts aimed at the adoption of effective measures in this Committee's field of competence. Although the challenges remain great, we believe that each and every nation has an important part to play in the building of a renewed sense of purpose, while recognizing that those States with the largest arsenals, whose actions can have the greatest impact in the field of disarmament, bear special responsibilities.

In the past few years a decrease in tension between the major Powers has led to the creation of more favourable conditions for the pursuit of our objective of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war. In this regard, it is my Government's view that this Committee should concentrate its attention on three main broad areas — namely, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transparency in armaments, and the diffusion of science and technology for peaceful purposes. Work on these issues can provide us with the foundations for building peace on more just and longer-lasting terms.

The elimination of nuclear weapons should remain at the very top of our agenda. There are still enough nuclear weapons in the world for life on this planet to be destroyed many times over. Recent events have illustrated that nuclear-weapons proliferation remains a real and threatening possibility as long as such weapons of mass destruction exist and as long as a matrix exists. In order to eliminate the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons, there can be no alternative but the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons. In this connection, Brazil considers that the international community should develop a truly comprehensive regime of non-proliferation and a complete ban on all arms of mass destruction on a universally accepted, fair and non-discriminatory basis.

Latin America's contribution to the preservation of international peace and security entitles it to speak with authority on this matter. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Celso Amorim, stated in the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly,

> "Latin America has been a factor of international stability in a turbulent world. Our legal tradition, built through decades of efforts to regulate inter-American relations, represents a relevant contribution to the international community. As pioneers in the promotion of disarmament, we feel entitled to seek equivalent gestures from the entire international community, and in particular from the nuclear-weapon States." (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth session, Plenary Meetings, 4th meeting, p. 5*)

Brazil has taken decisive steps to enhance the peaceful environment that has prevailed in Latin America. At the beginning of the current year the Brazilian Government ratified the quadripartite agreement signed with Argentina, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials to place all nuclear facilities in both countries under IAEA safeguards. In addition, Brazil has ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and worked with others to bring it fully into force. Through these and other initiatives we have reaffirmed our commitment to the worldwide prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects and to the strengthening of international cooperation in our part of the world.

We follow with great interest developments in Africa which will, in all likelihood, soon keep another entire continent free of nuclear weapons. It is our wish to build upon the successful cooperation among nations in the South Atlantic to preserve this entire ocean for peaceful purposes through the initiative of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic. It is noteworthy in this context that the Third Meeting of the States of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, held in Brasilia last September, adopted unanimously a declaration on the denuclearization of the South Atlantic.

Over recent decades the international flow of armaments reached massive levels as a result of the perverse logic of the cold war and its concomitant regional tensions. We believe that greater transparency in armaments can constitute a crucial confidence-building measure with a view to diminishing and even eliminating suspicion among States. The full operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms deserves to be hailed, in this context, as a most important multilateral initiative designed to promote transparency in armaments.

Brazil has actively participated in the establishment and consolidation of the Register and will continue to do so.

In addition, we find that the increased exchange of information on military expenditures contributes to the predictability of military activities, thus strengthening confidence among States on a global and regional level.

Along with what could be termed the "negative commitment" regarding non-proliferation and the "neutral commitment" towards greater transparency in armaments, Brazil is strongly in favour of a "positive commitment" directed at diffusing dual-use technologies for peaceful purposes. The international community should develop clear and universally acceptable guidelines for the application and transfer of sensitive technologies which should take into account legitimate requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that they do not deny access to high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes.

We are firmly convinced that there is scope for developing a positive relationship between disarmament and development through scientific and technological cooperation. It is clear to us that the fruits of human endeavours in this field should benefit all mankind and that the expertise once harnessed for destructive purposes can and should be channelled into the promotion of economic growth and social well-being for an ever larger number of individuals throughout the world.

Brazil regrets the fact that during the last session of the Disarmament Commission delegations were unable to reach a final consensus on the draft guidelines and recommendations on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other, related fields. Despite the difficulties encountered in the efforts to achieve a successful conclusion to the work of the Commission, we deem it possible — indeed, necessary — to consolidate the areas of agreement and wide consensus achieved therein with a view to promoting follow-up on the subject in the appropriate forums, including this Committee.

The three broad areas that I have just outlined are, of course, related, and the connections between them must be duly taken into account in our deliberations. We should not lose sight of a wider perspective within which disarmament becomes, in turn, closely associated with the concepts of democracy and development, in so far as it constitutes one of the pillars of a more just and equitable international order.

We sincerely hope that in the coming weeks our joint efforts will bring us closer to achieving the common objective of promoting international peace and security as defined in the Charter. The Brazilian delegation stands ready to participate actively, constructively and productively in the work of this Committee.

**Mr. Whannou** (Benin) *(interpretation from French)*: In his capacity as current Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, the head of the delegation of Benin has already conveyed to you, Mr. Chairman, our delegation's congratulations. However, I should like for my part to say how pleased my delegation is at the way in which you, Mr. Chairman, are directing our work.

The delegation of Benin is grateful to the Secretary-General for his preliminary statement. I should like to take the opportunity provided by this general debate to give a brief outline of my Government's views on some agenda items relating to the problem of disarmament and international security. The ending of the war of ideologies has removed the risk of worldwide confrontation and has created favourable conditions for world peace and security. However, there are still obstacles in the way of any lasting qualitative transformation on the basis of concord and stability, and it is essential that there be unceasing efforts to secure world peace through the elimination of aggressive capacities.

We must welcome the positive developments at various levels in the matter of the control and limitation of armaments. Resolute pursuit of our common disarmament efforts should make it possible to release the peace dividends and to use the funds thus saved to finance development as the foundation of peace — something that was emphasized by the Secretary-General in his 1994 report on the work of the Organization.

Not only shall we try to make progress in the process of nuclear disarmament, but we must also continue with programmes for the destruction of these weapons and their delivery vehicles. We must also strengthen confidence-building measures, such as transparency in the military field, with a view to developing measures for the control and limitation of armaments.

We have a common interest in seeing mankind rid of nuclear weapons, the very existence of which constitutes a serious threat to the security of all. Hence the need to abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence, which merely perpetuates nuclear tension. This policy is rendered obsolete particularly by the fact that the present

international situation favours cooperation. Without doubt, there are positive developments in sight. I am thinking in particular of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, of a convention that would ban the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, and of an agreement to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of such weapons.

We anxiously await the conclusion of negotiations that were initiated by the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, we are grateful to the Governments of Australia and Sweden for their submission of draft treaties on the cessation of all nuclear tests. We would approve any universal treaty that was multilaterally and effectively verifiable.

Benin also attaches considerable importance to the question of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This should be part and parcel of the process of securing the total elimination of these weapons, which is why we believe that the 1995 review Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should contribute to strengthening that regime. If the non-proliferation Treaty is to be strengthened, it must be made more nearly universal. This implies the accession of the largest possible number of the States that are currently hindered from acceding because of the discriminatory nature of the Treaty.

Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards should cover objective and not selective control of all high technology for dual use in the civilian and military fields, as well as obligatory reporting of suspect civilian nuclear plants. Sanctions should also be imposed on those who are intent on misinformation. Hence, we believe that there should be a revision of the non-proliferation Treaty that can be seen only in the context of a limited extension of the Treaty of 1968.

To be effective, global disarmament measures should be supplemented by regional arrangements, such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones or denuclearized zones. In this context, we would welcome the early entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has been open for signature since 1967. This Treaty, which deals with the denuclearization of Latin America and the Caribbean, must be acceded to by all States in the region if it is to be strengthened.

With the advent of a new, united, multiracial, democratic South Africa, which has made a clear commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a treaty related to the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964 is now certain. The draft of that treaty is now in its final stage. The participants in the most recent OAU summit, which was held in Tunis, felt that the group of experts should now take up the question of the geographical delimitation of that particular area. Africa knows that it can continue to rely on the support of Member States for the completion of this draft.

In order to avoid any military imbalance between regions, we would encourage the other parts of the world to overcome any obstacles in the way of their denuclearization. We would like to refer, in the same context, to the fact that the third Ministerial Meeting of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, which was held in Brasilia, Brazil, on 21 and 27 September 1994 adopted, among other conclusions, guarantees for the security, survival and individual and collective well-being of the area in the form of a declaration on the denuclearization of the South Atlantic, a maritime region of strategic and economic importance in the world.

We should continue our efforts to eliminate other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons. The biological weapons Convention, which has been in force since 1975, should be strengthened, especially in view of the fact that it does not contain verification provisions guaranteeing its full-scale application. We support the proposals made by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on verification, which advocated *inter alia* an exchange of information and on-site inspections.

With respect to the chemical weapons Convention, which is expected to come into force in 1995, we must ensure that its implementation contributes to the use of technology and chemical products for peaceful purposes of social and economic development.

Throughout the world mines are endangering civilian populations. At present, the United Nations is, to its credit, turning resolutely to the dangerous task of mine clearance. It is encouraging that there is a moratorium on the export of mines pending the convening and conclusions of the Review Conference of parties to the Convention on the use of certain conventional weapons, particularly Protocol II, on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices. We congratulate the Group of Governmental Experts which has been preparing for this Conference on its interim report. This Review Conference

will give us the opportunity to endow the Convention with the force it needs to be effective. To this end, the Convention should contain measures of effective control or verification, and bans and limitations on both the production and export of these devices.

In connection with the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields, it is clear from the report of the Disarmament Commission (A/49/42) — whose deliberations, among others, are paving the way for negotiations on multilateral disarmament agreements — that there was no consensus on a text containing guidelines and recommendations on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and allied fields. There was disagreement on the paragraph dealing with the transfer for peaceful purposes of high technology used for both military and civilian purposes. In the view of my delegation, it would be in the interest of the harmonious development of mankind — and a matter of importance — to encourage international cooperation in the use of science and technology through transfers and the exchange of technical and scientific know-how for peaceful purposes, in order to promote sustainable development and maintain international security.

In order to achieve progress in the disarmament process, it is important to have recourse to collateral measures such as transparency in military areas. These measures will make it possible to dispel concerns, fear, suspicion and tension, and therefore reduce the risk of military confrontation which results from an excessive accumulation of weapons. That is why the area of application of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms should be expanded so that it may benefit from the support of the largest possible number of States and be made effective.

In conclusion, the question of the control and limitation of weapons is one of the challenges before us at a time when the United Nations is approaching an important turning-point in its history, with the celebration in 1995 of its fiftieth anniversary. If the United Nations is to be able to meet this challenge by establishing common measures, taking into account the security concerns of all, it is up to us to take the necessary steps, such as adapting the multilateral negotiation machinery to the realities of the present day in order to make it possible for progress to be made in this lengthy political process of disarmament. Furthermore, we should consider either holding a special session of the General Assembly or undertaking an examination of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, in order to evaluate what has been achieved in the disarmament field and to establish our priorities for the coming years.

The delegation of Benin would like to emphasize that we should avoid any initiative which could be counter-productive and which might necessitate a legal ruling from the International Court of Justice on questions which are essentially political in nature, such as those of the legality of the use or a threat of the use of nuclear weapons. At the appropriate time my delegation will reiterate the views of our Government on this initiative which, in the current context of ongoing negotiations, is not likely to facilitate progress in the cause of general and complete disarmament under international control.

**The Chairman**: In view of the large number of delegations on the list of speakers I again appeal to all representatives to limit their statements to 10 minutes. This will enable us to conclude our general debate in accordance with the programme of work and timetable we adopted earlier.

**Election of the Rapporteur**

**The Chairman**: You will recall that at our organizational meeting on Thursday, 5 October, I informed you that consultations were still being held on the candidacy for the post of Rapporteur of the Committee. I am happy to inform you that following those consultations we are now in a position to proceed to the election of the Rapporteur.

I now call on the representative of Burkina Faso to present the nomination.

**Mr. Serme** (Burkina Faso) *(interpretation from French)*: At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your distinguished election as Chairman of the First Committee. I would also like to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Adolf von Wagner, who made a valuable contribution to our work at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

The delegation of Burkina Faso has the honour to nominate Mr. Peter Goosen of the Republic of South Africa for the office of Rapporteur of the First Committee. Mr. Goosen, who was born in Johannesburg in May 1956, is currently Deputy Director in the Department of Foreign Affairs and is responsible for the Department dealing with non-proliferation and weapons control. Before assuming that eminent responsibility, Mr. Goosen served in various posts of no less importance. Suffice it to mention that in

1982 he was given responsibility for training junior officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs in South Africa. From 1983 to 1987 he served as Third Secretary of the South African Embassy in London. From 1987 to 1989 he was head of the Bureau of Political Affairs in the Department, while serving also as Private Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 1989 to 1991, Mr. Goosen served as First Secretary of the Embassy of South Africa in Washington.

Mr. Goosen received a diploma from Pietermaritzburg University in Natal where he studied economics and political science in 1977. In 1979 he received his Bachelor of Law degree from the same University. His academic and professional experience has been supplemented by many training seminars in areas ranging from finance management, computer science and languages. The nomination of Mr. Goosen would serve as a dual symbol of the new South Africa and of African youth. We consider therefore that the First Committee that has always worked for the benefit of Africa and to ensure a secure future for youth will indeed endorse his candidacy.

**The Chairman:** I thank the representative of Burkina Faso for the nomination of Mr. Peter Goosen of South Africa for election to the post of Rapporteur of the First Committee.

On behalf of the First Committee and on my own behalf, I would request that representative to convey our sincere gratitude to Mr. Macaire Kabore for the important contribution he made to the work of the Committee during the forty-eighth session as Rapporteur of the Committee.

Members of the Committee have just heard the representative of Burkina Faso nominate Mr. Peter Goosen for election to the post of Rapporteur. As there are no other nominations, I take it that the Committee wishes to follow the same procedure as before and dispense with the secret ballot and declare Mr. Goosen elected Rapporteur of the First Committee by acclamation.

*It was so decided.*

**The Chairman**: I wish to express my most sincere and cordial congratulations to Mr. Goosen, the representative of South Africa, upon his election as Rapporteur of the First Committee.

**Mr. Steward** (South Africa): South Africa greatly appreciated the confidence shown by the African Group in nominating Mr. Peter Goosen for the post of Rapporteur of the Committee and the competent introduction by the representative of Burkina Faso.

South Africa is honoured to receive the unanimous support of the Committee for its candidate for the post. I regard this as particularly symbolic in the light of developments in South Africa — first the remarkable peaceful transition to a democratic government and, more pertinently, to the unprecedented — I repeat, unprecedented — dismantling of a nuclear-weapons programme and destruction of existing nuclear devices.

We had not anticipated early enough that South Africa would be called to this important office and consequently our expert who is coming from South Africa will be unable to assume his responsibilities until later this week. May I, however, on your Rapporteur's behalf, assure the Committee of his full cooperation.

**Statement by the Chairman**

**The Chairman:** I would like to remind the Committee that, in accordance with its decision, as reflected in its programme of work and timetable, the list of speakers for the general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items will be closed this afternoon at 6 p.m. I urge those delegations wishing to participate in the general debate to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible.

*The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.*

United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.4

# General Assembly

Forty-ninth session

*Official Records*

## First Committee

4th Meeting
Tuesday, 18 October 1994, 10 a.m.
New York

*Chairman*: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . . (Ecuador)

*The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.*

**Statement by the Chairman**

**The Chairman** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to extend a warm welcome to the participants in the 1994 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme. I understand that as part of their programme of studies in New York, they will attend meetings of the First Committee. It is my hope that they will derive benefit from the Committee's deliberations.

**Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153 (*continued*)**

**General debate on all disarmament and international security items**

**The Chairman** (*interpretation from Spanish*): The first speaker on the list of speaker's for this meeting is the representative of Switzerland, on whom I now call.

**Mr. Moser** (Switzerland) (*interpretation from French*): I should like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your wealth of professional experience and your tried and tested skills as a mediator are a guarantee of the success of this Committee's important work.

In order to lighten the First Committee's workload, my delegation shall distribute a document which describes in greater detail my Government's positions on the major subjects discussed by this Committee. My oral statement will therefore be limited to the following comments.

Although international cooperation in the field has made significant progress over the past few years, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a cause for serious concern. Adherence to existing treaties is not universal and some contracting parties have not been reluctant to interpret their commitments as they see fit. My country, which has renounced all weapons of mass destruction, is determined to comply scrupulously with its obligations not to contribute in any way to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to take all necessary measures to that end.

Next year will be decisive for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Switzerland fully supports the objectives of non-proliferation, but we also hope that effective measures will continue to be taken towards nuclear disarmament with a view to making progress towards the ultimate objective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is of such importance for international security that no effort must be spared to ensure its long-term extension by consensus.

Regarding the biological weapons Convention, Switzerland has regretted from the outset the absence of verification machinery. We are therefore pleased that the Special Conference of States Parties held in Geneva from 19 to 30 September was eventually able to mandate an ad hoc Group to fill that gap.

Switzerland has always supported balanced, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaties. One agreement which we consider to be an outstanding example in that regard is the Convention on chemical weapons. It is my pleasure to announce that the Swiss Federal Assembly on

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27 September 1994, ratified that Convention and adopted the legislative measures necessary for its implementation in our country.

For Switzerland, the strengthening of transparency measures in the area of conventional weapons is extremely important. It would be regrettable to lose the impetus that led to the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, my delegation took a stand in favour of supplementing the Register by the inclusion of information on military stocks and troops. We sincerely hope that certain qualms will soon be overcome and that we will be able to begin our work in a constructive spirit.

The 1981 inhumane weapons Convention is of particular importance to my country. On nearly every continent, entire regions have been doomed by the massive and indiscriminate dispersal of mines. The human costs of this scourge are horrendous. There is a need to review the 1981 Convention in order to make it both more effective and more attractive. The Swiss Federal Council decided on 11 May to implement a moratorium on the sale of land-mines to those States which have not ratified Protocol II. Switzerland hopes that other States will soon join those which have already adopted such a measure.

My country is aware, however, that moratoriums alone are insufficient. Switzerland has therefore proposed to the Expert Group mandated to prepare the review Conference the complete ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, import, export and use of non-detectable and anti-personnel mines that are not provided with a self-destruction or neutralization mechanism or process.

We are also aware of the unacceptable damage caused by new types of weapons and ammunition, and we support efforts aimed at controlling their use. My country has, *inter alia*, proposed that a new protocol be drafted concerning small-calibre arms and ammunition. I must admit that the deliberations within the Expert Group have yet to satisfy us fully. We hope that, at the next meeting of the Group, it will be possible to achieve more substantive results.

I shall conclude my comments by noting that the political impetus shown in the First Committee is having an ever greater effect on specific negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. This gives grounds for great satisfaction and we hope that this constructive spirit can be maintained in the interests of progress. For that same reason I must however, once again, express my Government's regret that the Conference on Disarmament still has not succeeded in settling the question of the expansion of its membership and I hope that it will be able to do so in the very near future.

**The Chairman** *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I thank the representative of Switzerland for the document he will be circulating in the Committee. I am certain that the Committee will read it very attentively.

**Mr. Holum** (United States of America): In keeping with the reforms recently introduced, I will give a shorter oral version of my statement in contrast to the longer text that has been distributed.

The United States congratulates you, Sir, on your election and pledges its cooperation in the important work that lies ahead.

Congratulations are also due to the United Nations itself on its success in clearing away much of the divisive ideological and political underbrush that occupied so much time, to so little effect, during the era of maximum East-West and North-South confrontation. By focusing on more substantive international problems, the United Nations is earning the world's confidence and growing trust. So when we celebrate the United Nations fiftieth anniversary next year, we will be celebrating a maturation of international statesmanship as well.

A testament to that transition would be prompt, favourable action on the United States initiative on anti-personnel landmines, as highlighted by President Clinton in his address to the General Assembly three weeks ago.

It has become customary for those in my position to conduct a *tour d'horizon* of arms control efforts from the United States perspective. But today I will break with that custom to address a single issue of surpassing importance: the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons.

The world community should have no higher arms control priority in the months to come than the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. The decision awaiting us next April is the most historic decision that most of us will ever face.

The entry of the Treaty into force in 1970 transformed the action of becoming a nuclear-weapon State from one of

national pride to a violation of international law and the law still prevails.

During the 1960s, when the non-proliferation Treaty was negotiated, many predicted that there would be 20 or 30 avowed nuclear-weapon States today. Reputable estimates place the number of States now having the required technical and economic resources at over 40. But there are still only five nuclear-weapon States — the same as when the non-proliferation Treaty was brought into force — and three other "threshold" States.

The non-proliferation Treaty system has broadened tangibly in recent years; with the accessions of China, France, South Africa, the Baltics and nearly all of the newly independent States, including Belarus and Kazakhstan; the announced intentions of Argentina and Algeria; and the non-nuclear decisions of Chile and Brazil. With nearly 170 parties now, the non-proliferation Treaty enjoys the widest adherence of any arms-control agreement in history.

Because it has global reach, the non-proliferation Treaty sets the fundamental legal standard and political framework for all the cases of greatest concern to the international community. But the true value of the non-proliferation Treaty is reflected in the group of States that is almost entirely ignored in discussions on the non-proliferation Treaty, namely all the others — all the others — all the States for which nuclear arms are not an issue, because they have made and kept nuclear non-proliferation commitments. The greatest achievements of the non-proliferation Treaty are invisible, consisting of bad things not happening, nuclear material not diverted, weapons not made.

Without the non-proliferation Treaty, one must assume that over time many of those bad things would begin to happen — and dozens of States could seek to hedge their nuclear bets against an uncertain future.

Let me address the principal arguments against indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Some complain that the Treaty is "discriminatory" because it accepts five nuclear Powers and freezes out all others, but the Treaty did not create nuclear-weapon "haves" and "have-nots". It only reflected that inherited reality — and helped stop a deadly trend in its tracks — while at the same time committing all parties, including the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The measure of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements lies not in their egalitarianism, but in their contributions to international security.

The fact is, if the world were to insist today on a reflexive nuclear equality, the likely result would be a levelling up, not a levelling down; not a world freed of nuclear weapons, but a world filled with nuclear-weapon States.

Another argument one hears is that indefinite extension would legitimate nuclear weapons for all time. In fact, the opposite is true. In recent years, with the non-proliferation Treaty in place, the United States and the former Soviet Union have eliminated over 2,500 intermediate-range missiles, taking an entire class of weapons out of commission; decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands more tactical nuclear arms; and agreed in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) and the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) to take more than 17,000 nuclear weapons off missiles and bombers.

The call in the non-proliferation Treaty for an end to the arms race has been met. The race now is to bring down force levels as quickly, safely and securely as possible.

The Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review has recently confirmed that nuclear weapons now play a smaller role in United States security strategy than ever. Since 1988 we have reduced our total active stockpile by 59 per cent; our strategic warheads by 47 per cent; and our non-strategic nuclear-force warheads by a remarkable 90 per cent. The United States is at present dismantling around 2000 nuclear weapons a year, the highest rate that technical limitations will permit.

During last month's summit in Washington, President Clinton and President Yeltsin instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue on the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of nuclear forces. They also agreed, once START II was ratified, immediately to unload all affected nuclear warheads, instead of waiting until the controlled bombers and missiles were taken down.

So the world can see its two leading nuclear Powers move from limiting delivery vehicles and weapons systems towards openly and irreversibly eliminating nuclear warheads. As President Clinton affirmed recently in his joint communiqué with Indian Prime Minister Rao, we envisage, ultimately, a world free of such arms.

Now the ledger in fulfilment of article VI includes two additional multilateral efforts — to conclude the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty already under way and to negotiate a world-wide fissile material cut-off treaty.

Concluding the comprehensive test-ban treaty is an imperative for the United States, a fact underscored on two occasions this year when I delivered personal messages from President Clinton to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The President's first message said that of all the items on the agenda of the Conference, "none is more important" than negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty "at the earliest possible time". The second stressed that "earliest possible time" means exactly what it says. We are doing everything in our power to make the first half-century of nuclear explosions the last. Indeed, as shown by our moratorium on testing while the negotiations proceed, we are prepared for the conclusion that the United States has already conducted its last nuclear-weapons test.

A cut-off treaty would cap the amount of material available for nuclear explosives. It could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of certain States not parties to the NPT under some measure of international restraint for the first time. We urge all States represented here to reaffirm last year's consensus, and we urge adoption of a simple negotiating mandate in the Conference on Disarmament.

I began working on arms control issues in the late 1960s as an aide to Senator George McGovern. Now I have the mission of advocating arms control within the United States Government, and negotiating it with other Governments. The NPT inspires this work, to be sure, through article VI. But more important, the NPT makes these efforts possible by giving the United States, as well as other countries, a clear view of a secure world, in which these arms can safely be laid down.

It is a fact that if the future of the NPT is jeopardized, the prospects for future arms control will diminish; if the future of the NPT is secured, the steep trend in reductions can continue. Indefinite extension of the NPT will bring us closer to the day when nuclear weapons will be banished for ever; anything less will put that day off. Simply put, further progress in arms control depends on a permanent NPT.

Well, it is argued, why not hold up the NPT — or just extend it for a short time — as a way to force even greater progress on the nuclear-weapon States? Some, for example, suggest that we should hold the extension of the NPT hostage to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and then make it permanent. But those who think the NPT is a bargaining chip ignore a cardinal rule: do not gamble with something you cannot afford to lose.

For reasons that include geography, the States most immediately put at risk by nuclear proliferaters are their immediate and regional neighbours — not the United States. We support the NPT in our own interests, to be sure, but we do so even more strongly in the interests of those States located in regions of tension.

The NPT gives all member countries the security of knowing that their neighbours and regional rivals will not be able effectively to pursue nuclear-weapons ambitions — not only because they have agreed not to, but also because there is a global system for verifying that they have not done so.

For all those whose votes will decide its fate, the NPT is a source, not of leverage, but of security. It has the same true value for every country: not as a lever for moving the nuclear-weapon States, but as a shield to ward off the dangers and costs of regional arms races.

The related proposition that indefinite extension can be put off is particularly dangerous because it is so seductively plausible — and so wrong. The Treaty spells out three, and only three, extension options: indefinite extension, extension for a fixed period, or extension for fixed periods. Any but the first risks crippling the Treaty — either by involving the legal uncertainty of a series of piecemeal extensions, or by requiring the practical impossibility of immediate or eventual amendment. Those who invent scenarios to avoid this basic truth have failed to carry their burden of proving that permanent extension can be deferred without the grave risk that it will be denied.

Another frequent criticism of the NPT is that certain States have not joined. Let there be no doubt: the United States strongly favours universal adherence, but enlarging the prospect that the NPT may lapse at some point makes it less likely — not more likely — that States such as Israel, India and Pakistan will ultimately join. The best chance for their ultimate adherence lies in a strong Treaty that is a permanent part of the international security system.

The real question is not whether the NPT can solve every problem by itself, but whether the world is better off with it than without it. No one can predict definitively the nature of a world without the NPT, but each of us must

think concretely about the massive proliferation pressures that could be tragically unleashed if the Treaty ever expires.

The Japanese have a saying: "The nail that stands out will be hammered down." All States have felt the hammering force of the NPT against nuclear proliferation, but in a world without the Treaty, States might avoid standing out, not by resisting pressures to have nuclear weapons, but by succumbing to them.

In June 1946, when the United Nations and the nuclear age were both in their infancy, Bernard Baruch addressed the United Nations with the portentous words, "We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead." The road then taken led to a nuclear arms race that lasted for almost five decades.

In the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union scaled the nuclear heights — in the process expending staggering resources and talent, risking human health and the environment, and making the perils of nuclear catastrophe a daily companion. Now, at last, we are climbing down from the precipice. And we implore Member States — with urgency and from our own experience: do not start up that mountain. Its crevasses are treacherous; avalanches are a constant risk; the trip will drain your time and your treasury. The two States that have spent the most time at the highest altitudes are returning to Earth with alacrity and relief.

The Clinton Administration is committed to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. We will achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty — the only question is "When?" — and "sooner" is a much better answer than "later": 1995 is our only realistic chance to make the NPT permanent. Now especially, with super-Power arsenals falling and the prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty rising — with the largest nuclear-weapon Powers finally able to de-emphasize nuclear weapons in their defence planning — now, I say, is not the time to abandon the agreement that enables us to turn the arms race around.

The decision we face today is as fundamental as that of 1946. But to choose wisely between the living and the dead, we must be wideawake. We need to elevate extension of the NPT to the higher plane where it belongs — above the din of international politics as usual, above the jockeying and horse-trading. History will not treat us kindly if we miscalculate with our children's security.

We must acknowledge that, just six months from now, we will be taking, together, the most fateful single vote affecting world peace in the remainder of this century and for years to come.

If our seriousness of purpose reflects the true stakes, I know we will do the right thing — and safeguard this indispensable agreement for all nations, for all people, for all time.

**The President** (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the document he is making available to the Committee. The Committee will examine it very carefully.

**Mr. Tanaka** (Japan): Let me first, on behalf of the Japanese delegation, extend to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-ninth session. You may be assured of my delegation's full cooperation as you strive to guide the work of the First Committee to a successful conclusion.

I have just learned that the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the nuclear issue ended in agreement last night and were concluded on an *ad interim* basis. Japan genuinely welcomes that agreement as providing the foundation for the solution of the issue based on dialogue and consultations.

The maintenance of international peace and security is the primary area of concern to the United Nations. As Japan's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yohei Kono, affirmed in his address in the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September, in that area of endeavour Japan places great emphasis on disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan, the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, strictly observes the three principles of not producing, not possessing and not allowing into its territory nuclear weapons of any kind. It is steadfastly committed to the ultimate goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan supports the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for an indefinite period and calls on all States that have not yet acceded to that Treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity.

In the report on the nuclear-posture review, recently released by the Department of Defense, the United States indicated that once START II had been ratified, and if the

present favourable trend in its relations with the newly independent States that were formerly part of the Soviet Union continued, it would work for further reductions in its strategic nuclear arms. Speaking before the General Assembly on 26 September, President Clinton declared that the United States and the Russian Federation were

> "working on agreements to halt production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives; to make dismantling of nuclear warheads transparent and irreversible; and further to reduce [their] nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 4th meeting, p. 8)*

In his address to the General Assembly on that same day, President Yeltsin stated that

> "we should...give thought to further steps to limit Russian and American strategic nuclear weapons." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th meeting, p. 3)*

We heartily welcome those statements as indications that the trend towards further nuclear disarmament remains strong.

With respect to the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear- test-ban treaty, which are under way in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, a rolling text has already been formulated and negotiations will resume immediately after the First Committee concludes its work. Japan hopes that substantial progress will be made on technical issues by the end of this year and that, building on such progress, full-fledged negotiations on key political issues will be largely completed early in the session of the Conference on Disarmament next year so that before the extension Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty is convened we may be confident that a comprehensive test-ban treaty will be concluded. As Foreign Minister Kono proposed in his statement in the General Assembly, once the negotiations on the treaty are concluded, a ceremony for its signing by heads of State or Government might be held in Japan — for example, in the city of Hiroshima. The occasion could be viewed as a new starting-point for efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all.

Japan attaches great importance to the prohibition of the production of fissile material for explosive purposes, the so-called "cut-off". Indeed, Japan considers the cut-off to be a global nuclear-disarmament measure of no less importance than the comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are therefore encouraged that agreement in principle was achieved to begin negotiations on this important undertaking in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan hopes that Ambassador Shannon of Canada, in his capacity as Special Coordinator on the cut-off, will succeed in reaching agreement on the negotiating mandate and that the negotiations will in fact begin without delay.

The stability of the international community requires that appropriate security assurances be given to non-nuclear-weapon States. Japan therefore welcomes the fact that nuclear-weapon States are seriously considering this matter, and it hopes that their efforts will result in concrete measures.

As I have noted, numerous significant initiatives have been taken in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, creating a more favourable political environment for the non-proliferation Treaty extension Conference scheduled for April 1995. Various issues relating to extension of the Treaty were seriously discussed, and progress was made at the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 1995 Treaty Conference held at Geneva in mid-September. It is disappointing, however, that complete agreement has not been reached on, for example, the organizational matters of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee. Japan would like to call upon Ambassador Ayewah, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee at its third session, to conduct further intensive consultations on the pending organizational issues so that the procedures will be in place to ensure that the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty is effected smoothly.

I find it profoundly regrettable that, on 7 October, China once again conducted a nuclear test. China's action is particularly discouraging at this time, when the moratorium on nuclear testing is being observed by other nuclear-weapon States as part of their nuclear-non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and when all non-nuclear-weapon States are also making serious efforts to achieve that goal. Nuclear testing at this time flies in the face of these international efforts, and Japan calls upon China to desist from conducting further tests.

During the latter half of last month a special conference was held on biological weapons, which are a category of weapons of mass destruction. Japan welcomes the agreement reached at the conference to establish an ad hoc group to ensure compliance with the biological weapons convention and to prepare for the formulation of a legally binding instrument. Furthermore, Japan hopes that the chemical weapons Convention will enter into force as

quickly as possible, and is working vigorously for its ratification.

We welcome the progress that is being made through these international efforts in the elimination and non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction.

We continue to witness the suffering caused by conventional weapons in conflicts in various parts of the world. The unregulated transfer and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons destabilize the regions concerned and intensify the destructiveness of civil wars. For its part, Japan adheres strictly to its policy of not exporting weapons. As Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yanagisawa argued in his address to the Conference on Disarmament on 1 September, Japan considers it essential to world peace and stability that the leading arms-producing countries should limit their exports of weapons in order not to aggravate regional instability. Furthermore, the question of anti-personnel land-mines should be seriously addressed, both as a disarmament problem and as a humanitarian issue. Japan intends to participate actively in the work of reviewing the Convention on conventional weapons in order to tighten the controls on the use and availability of land-mines.

The promotion of measures for transparency in armaments is also an extremely important aspect of arms control and disarmament in the area of conventional weapons. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was established in 1992 at the initiative of Japan and European countries, had gained the participation of 82 countries by 29 September of this year. I find it especially gratifying that several important countries in the Asia-Pacific region have joined the ranks of participants this year. Japan trusts that the discussions conducted in the Conference on Disarmament and by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, as well as in such regional forums as those of the Association of South-East Asian States (ASEAN), will prove useful in strengthening and expanding the Register. We therefore hope that the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts will meet again, in 1996 at the latest, to consider further expansion of the Register.

Japan has endeavoured to promote international understanding on transparency in armaments, for example by co-hosting seminars with the United Nations. Moreover, I believe the United Nations regional disarmament centres will have a greater role to play in enhancing the transparency of conventional weapons and promoting arms control on a regional basis. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, in particular, has been very active in implementing various programmes. Japan hopes that the United Nations Secretariat will take positive measures, including measures in the fields of financing and personnel, further to enhance the activities of the United Nations regional disarmament centres. Continuing the annual practice that it inaugurated in 1989, Japan hosted a United Nations disarmament conference in Hiroshima this year and intends to host another in Nagasaki in 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

Next year, which also marks the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), various disarmament-related meetings will be held. The review and extension Conference on the NPT is but one important example. In this post-cold war era when efforts are being made to create a new world order based on dialogue and cooperation, Japan is determined to play a positive role in achieving further progress in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It is both strengthened and encouraged in its endeavours by the knowledge that international public support for disarmament is gaining momentum, steadily and surely.

**Mr. Guillén** (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I take pleasure in congratulating you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. My congratulations go also to the other officers of the Committee. I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor. My delegation is very confident that your experience and the cooperation of all delegations will ensure that the work that has started here will reach the objectives we all eagerly desire for each of the items now before us for consideration.

Since 1987, world military expenditures have continued steadily to decline. This is a heartening trend. However, initial reductions are generally the easiest to put into effect, and it is clear that much still remains to be done. These changes reflect, at the same time, progress in the execution of structural adjustment programmes in developing countries and in the States of Eastern Europe, along with continued and widespread budgetary pressures. It is estimated that reductions to date amount to approximately $935 billion, and forecasts for the next five years indicate an additional amount of $460 billion.

Beset as they are domestically by a large number of complex social and economic problems related to development, the developing countries have an even greater

need for disarmament. Although certain regions have made less progress than others in this context, the overall picture is very encouraging, especially in contrast to the excessive expenditures of the past. However, despite the significant progress that has been achieved, there are still no very visible signs of links between disarmament and development. On the other hand, the link between the arms race mentality and under-development is more evident at this stage.

In our opinion, the priority issue in this area should be effective international regulation of the arms trade. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a positive step in this direction, but it could be improved by inclusion of information on existing stocks, local production and local arms procurement. The Register could also incorporate certain other significant categories of weapons so as properly to reflect the specific security interests of each region.

In this context, we cannot overlook the fact that the permanent members of the Security Council are continuing to supply the highest proportion of the conventional weapons exported to the developing countries. At the same time, they are continuing to develop military programmes dating back to the 1970s and 1980s. This is to some extent a reflection of the influential role of military establishments, which resist change. Furthermore, the conversion of the military industry is proving to be a more complex and costly process than was initially thought.

We recognize the decisive importance of regional conventional disarmament for world peace and stability and in terms of supporting current efforts to promote development and economic restructuring. The removal of one source of antagonism has uncovered many others. Disarmament has not taken place automatically since the end of the cold war, thus disappointing our high and premature expectations. Rather, excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons is breeding regional instability. It is urgent and also now politically possible that disarmament negotiations should become genuinely multilateral in nature and that the developing countries should be effectively incorporated into the disarmament process and the building of new regional security systems. The regional organizations should become involved themselves in this process, strengthening their cooperation with the United Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace, Disarmament and Development should also play a constructive role in this regard. This requires them to refocus their principal activities and take on the task of promoting new security agreements in accordance with the needs outlined in the "An Agenda for Peace". These Centres should also envisage new structures for regional security and indicate specific priorities for disarmament on the regional level, thus paving the way for integration of the "Agenda for Peace" and the "Agenda for Development".

The now reduced but still persistent danger of nuclear disaster underscores the practical value of a central mechanism for coping with proliferation. That mechanism is the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For this reason, we believe that at the time of the crucial decision on its indefinite extension, beginning in 1995, there should also be progress on important issues related to this matter. I am thinking of reductions in and final destruction of existing nuclear weapons, the banning of all tests and of the production of fissile material, and effective security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Progress in these areas has been encouraging, but limited and uneven. However, eventual multilateral agreements on these points seem, now more than ever, to be within reach. The non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is an issue of great importance that will require renewed political resolve and will.

We believe that the nuclear Powers should refrain from carrying out nuclear tests for the duration of these negotiations, and that they should also include in existing bilateral agreements measures providing for the destruction of the nuclear weapons they are eliminating from their arsenals.

In this context, I wish to inform the Committee that, together with the provisional technical secretariat of the Preparatory Committee for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, of the Hague, the Government of Peru organized the second regional seminar for Latin America and the Caribbean on the national application of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which was held in Lima from 1 to 3 September of this year.

The United Nations peace operations are in need of urgent reform. The increasing proliferation of conflicts within national borders seems to be the most characteristic trait of current concerns about peace and security. Often, longstanding social and economic imbalances underlie ethnic, religious and intercommunal conflicts. Neither traditional peace-keeping operations nor major military operations seem to be the appropriate response, given the nature of the current widespread demand throughout the world for United Nations peace-keeping operations. This suggests the need to establish a special mechanism, which

might take the form of a lightly armed United Nations police force. The non-military nature of such a force would also make it easier to gain the consent of the parties and could, possibly, facilitate progress in other complex issues generally associated with peace-keeping operations, such as unity of command, the decision-making process, the desirability of activating the United Nations Military Staff Committee, and so on. This mechanism might also encourage Member States to contribute national police personnel, thus making it possible to broaden support for prudently undertaken and properly conducted peace-keeping operations.

Lastly, together with the questions to which I have already referred, at this session of the First Committee we also attach top priority to assistance in mine clearance and the moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines. We hope that in this way it will be possible to make progress in the immediate implementation of resolutions 48/7 and 48/75, which were adopted last year on these two items, respectively.

**Mr. Westdal** (Canada): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of our Committee. Your years of diplomatic and academic experience will be valuable in our deliberations and in the fulfilment of your demanding responsibilities. You can count on my personal support and on that of my delegation.

The time for action has now come. My statement today and the bearing and conduct of the Canadian delegation throughout our work will reflect this conviction.

We do not need more statements of intent; we need the political will to take decisions that will move the arms control and disarmament agenda forward at a pace and in a direction that the exigencies of the next century demand and that our people expect. We have not yet fully exploited the new opportunities for progress. We must act now or lose the momentum that has been so painstakingly developed over the last decades.

We are on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. Canada is deeply committed to strengthening the United Nations in all its aspects. The work that we carry out here in the First Committee must become an integral part of that strengthening process.

As the Security Council affirmed at its summit meeting in 1992, and as the Secretary-General repeated yesterday here, non-proliferation is vital to international security. Arms control and disarmament are essential elements in preventive diplomacy. The processes of arms control and disarmament build confidence. They are designed to bring transparency, dialogue and consultation to fields and to issues where secrecy usually reigns — not simply between Governments, but often within them.

Further, the techniques and mechanisms that have become part of effective verification regimes in multilateral arms control and disarmament arrangements are precisely the tools of conflict prevention: early warning, fact-finding, objective assessment of information, on-site inspection, and consultative mechanisms for raising and resolving questions or discrepancies. Arms-control experience has expanded the inventory of instruments available for use in diplomatic efforts. Many of these techniques were controversial and innovative. They broke new ground.

We must, here, break new ground. We must also consolidate the substantial gains we have made in arms control and disarmament, and ensure that we do not, through posturing, impede real progress. We expect progress on all the key issues on our agenda because we believe that progress is possible.

First, we have a responsibility here to ensure that the ground is effectively prepared for a successful review and for the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That Treaty is the mainstay of the non-proliferation system. It has worked. The NPT has enshrined a framework of values and principles that has prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitated the development of peaceful nuclear programmes and the transfer of materials and technologies for peaceful uses. The Treaty binds us to the long-term goal of general and complete disarmament. It is truly an extraordinary Treaty, one which Canada wants to see preserved indefinitely. It is also a Treaty that warrants universal adherence. We call on those who have not signed the Treaty to do so.

Second, we must provide impetus to the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a treaty to end all nuclear tests, in all environments, and for all time. A few years ago a comprehensive ban was only a dream: now, it is almost a reality. Negotiations are going well, but we want to pick up the pace. There is no reason to delay and every reason to move forward with deliberate speed. Intersessional work serves the goal I believe we all share — the earliest possible conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Third, a prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes is within our grasp. The First Committee should unite to affirm that all nations gathered here are committed to cutting off the production of fissile material for weapons. Last year, Canada sponsored a resolution in this Committee — one which was adopted by consensus — and, as a result, our Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Gerald Shannon, was named Special Coordinator entrusted with the task of identifying a negotiating mandate.

We have made some progress: agreement has been reached that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for negotiations and, in principle, that an ad hoc committee should be established. However, agreement on a negotiating mandate is proving elusive. Canada urges a pragmatic, constructive approach. It is surely within the negotiations themselves that the difficult issues of substance should be addressed. They cannot be resolved in the mandate. Negotiations must begin — and why not on the basis of the consensus we expressed last year? We should send the Conference on Disarmament — and more important, the world — a clear signal that the production of fissile material for weapons purposes must cease.

Fourth, we must halt the indiscriminate use and the abuse of anti-personnel land-mines. There are as many as 100 million land-mines still uncleared in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Central America and other States scarred by war. The wounds cannot heal when land-mines claim scores of victims a week, long after the fighting has stopped.

The most effective instrument at our disposal is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, and our chance to strengthen it at next year's review conference. Canada seeks to expand the Convention to include internal conflicts among the areas covered in Protocol II. We want also to develop mechanisms for effective verification. The humanitarian dimension of this issue is clear and compelling. Our debate here must set the stage for real progress in strengthening the Convention.

Fifth, let us not lose sight of the importance of the achievement last year, after decades of negotiation, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Canada will join in sponsoring a clear, concise draft resolution with a straightforward message: that the world will be a better place once there is universal accession to the chemical weapons Convention and once those weapons disappear from inventories and doctrines. We will look for the support of all delegations in building consensus on that draft resolution.

Sixth, we made real progress last month at the special conference of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, securing a mandate to prepare a legally binding instrument to promote and demonstrate compliance. Canada is strongly committed to this effort. Biological weapons have no place in the world. We want the First Committee to lend impetus to this process so that a draft legal instrument will be ready to present to the fourth review conference, to be held in 1996.

Seventh, the function of science and technology in the context of international security has long been an issue of special interest to Canada. Among States, there are pronounced differences of view, particularly in respect of the transfer of dual-use technology. For Canada, the solution must recognize the need for States to have access to the technology needed for their development and at the same time must provide assurances that such technology will be used for peaceful purposes only.

Over the past few years, Canada and Brazil have worked hard to achieve a consensus on this vital subject. We came very close at last year's session of the Disarmament Commission. We want to resume that effort. The issue is too important and too rich with potential for progress to be left off our agenda. Canada and Brazil will present a draft resolution to welcome the progress made in the Disarmament Commission, reaffirm the issue's importance and urge continued efforts towards a final consensus.

In his statement to the General Assembly on 29 September, my Foreign Minister emphasized that the task of controlling conventional weapons is the responsibility of every Government. We have established within the United Nations a transparency and confidence-building mechanism to contribute to an environment within which Governments might fulfil that responsibility: the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We want the Register to grow in scope and strength, and we want the Group of Experts to resume its work to that end. We urge others to join us in providing the Register with data on military holdings and procurement through national production.

We are concerned that there may be a lessening of political will to deal with conventional weapons, their transfers and excessive build-up. Given the conventional wars raging in the world and the huge sums of money being devoted to military spending, we believe that the Register warrants more political interest and practical support.

(*spoke in French*)

Before concluding, I would like to mention the study by the group of experts on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, which was established last year and which was chaired by my predecessor. In Canada's view, verification experience since the conclusion of the first United Nations study on this matter, in 1990, has revealed important new potential for effective United Nations action. We hope that all Member States will come to see this study in the broader context of efforts to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to address international peace and security issues in the post-cold-war world, in response to the challenges presented by the Secretary-General in his "An Agenda for Peace" and "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era".

(*spoke in English*)

In that broader context, we must recognize the vital contributions of regional organizations to international security. Canada is working actively within the Organization of American States, the regional forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and elsewhere to support our global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.

Our arms control and disarmament priorities and goals have not really changed much over the last 20 years. What has changed is that our goals can now be realized. We must take decisive action now — and here. We should have no tolerance for excuses, inaction or delaying tactics. Indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a cut-off convention, strengthened chemical weapons and biological weapons regimes, and other achievements are all within our grasp. We can catalyze action. With that goal, my delegation looks forward to working with other delegations and with you, Mr. Chairman, over the coming weeks.

**Mr. Ponce** (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The new expectations and growing demands faced by the United Nations since the end of the cold war have brought about an expansion of the Organization's work in the area of international peace and security, as reflected in the heightened activity of the Security Council. Because of the uncertainties resulting from new sources of conflict among States and from the proliferation of international action on situations within States, we should adapt the Organization in order to cope with these new challenges.

The destabilizing effects of adverse economic situations and their attendant social tensions fuel nationalist and religious intolerance and xenophobia and lead to the kindling or rekindling of complex disputes. Hence, the General Assembly's debate on "An Agenda for Peace" has been followed by discussion of an agenda for development, recognizing that international action should address both domains simultaneously as the only way to achieve international peace and security.

The Organization should contribute by instituting effective measures to meet basic human needs and putting in place a range of effective procedures for the settlement of disputes reaffirming the system of collective security. The extent of our success in negotiations to attain those objectives on clear, universal legal foundations will determine the advantage we can derive from the unique opportunity offered by the end of confrontation between ideological blocs.

There have been positive developments in the field of disarmament and arms control. In the sphere of nuclear disarmament, and as an important contribution towards the final goal of the complete elimination of such weapons, Ecuador hails the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The speedy conclusion of such a treaty, along with success in negotiations on banning fissile materials and the granting of positive guarantees to non-nuclear States — significant steps in themselves — would help create a favourable climate for the work of the 1995 review and extension conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has proven to be a particularly relevant instrument in controlling the dissemination of such weapons. The delegation of Ecuador considers that at the 1995 Conference measures should be agreed on to improve it so that it can enjoy universal validity for all time. In order to prevent indefinite extension from being used,

paradoxically, to retard progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, in addition to the importance of negotiations on tests, fissile materials and guarantees that I referred to earlier, it is important, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty, for the nuclear Powers to agree on specific programmes for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons.

The Government of Ecuador warmly welcomed the decisions announced by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile and Saint Lucia to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Ecuador is pleased to see the long-term endeavour in our region to promote disarmament and international peace and security culminate in the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone.

My Government has sent the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction to our Congress for ratification, and we attach the highest priority to its early entry into force, not only because of the harmful effects of such weapons but also because of the value of that Treaty in the process of eliminating weapons of mass destruction with a universal verification mechanism.

We hail the progress made in the Conference on Disarmament on a number of its agenda items, although we wish to voice our discouragement at the lack of agreement on the question of its possible expansion. We believe that the urgent and important tasks entrusted to the Conference would be properly addressed if it were made more representative by means of a geographically equitable expansion of its membership, consonant with the growth of our Organization. In this regard, Ecuador considers that new members must not be incorporated on the basis of selective criteria of dubious transparency, and for this reason we support the idea put forward yesterday by the spokesperson of the European Union:

> "...the most practical solution would be for all countries which have applied to date to be accepted without delay." (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, First Committee, 3rd meeting, p. 12*)

The Disarmament Commission was once again affected at its last session by the misuse of consensus, which, becoming a new form of veto, prevented the substantial progress made on the item "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" from being reflected in the report. My delegation trusts that this Committee will again take up the valuable result of those efforts to promote the adoption of international guidelines in this area, which is the only way to meet the demands of the right to development while at the same time preserving international peace and security and preventing transfers of technology with military applications from being controlled by selective practices that have not been negotiated on a world-wide basis.

The work done by mandate of this Committee in connection with the item "Relationship between disarmament and development" takes on particular relevance now, during the months when the "Agenda for Development" is being elaborated. The matter of the peace dividend has been part of the discussions on that "Agenda", the development and implementation of which offer opportunities for the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to make new contributions, which my delegation supports.

Although the agenda item "Assistance in mine clearance" has been allocated to plenary meetings, I would like to voice my Government's support for the establishment of a fund to finance cooperative activities to solve the tragic problems caused by the more than 100 million mines scattered around the world. My Government supports the initiative taken by the Andean countries, introduced by Bolivia in document A/49/357/Add.1, for that fund to be financed by resources provided by mine exporters and voluntary contributions so that at least a small portion of the resources derived from trade in those devices could be recycled into programmes designed to mitigate their disastrous effects.

**Mr. Keating** (New Zealand): My delegation joins others in offering its congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, on your election.

We are meeting today in the middle of one of the most challenging periods in international relations. The end of the cold war has led to an increase in trust and confidence between the major Powers. This has freed up the disarmament negotiating atmosphere, with the result that the world community is now moving ahead on a range of issues, some of them long overdue for action. But on a wider level there has been a tragic surge in conflict and insecurity at the regional level, and that underlines how far we still have to go, especially in the area of conventional weapons.

Let us focus first on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT has made a singular contribution to the world's security. It is not perfect, but there is no other treaty which binds 165 nations to the twin pursuits of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. There is no other treaty which provides an accepted framework for security in the nuclear age. It is for this reason that my Government strongly supports the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

Preparations for next year's Conference to review the NPT and to decide on its extension are occupying an increasingly large part of the disarmament agenda. We have the chance to make progress over the next six months on the questions of substance which flow from the Treaty. If we take the opportunities available to us, we will ensure the best possible environment for the decision we have to take on the future of the Treaty.

The recent announcement by President Clinton and President Yeltsin of an accelerated timetable for the implementation of the START I and START II Treaties is one such opportunity which has been taken. We congratulate them on it. Continued progress by all nuclear-weapons States towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament is an obligation which each assumed on becoming party to the NPT. Steps to this end build confidence and, in so doing, strengthen the non-proliferation norm created by the Treaty.

Secondly, with respect to nuclear testing, we have under way at last a multilateral negotiation to ban all nuclear tests for all time. This is an objective which has long been at the top of New Zealand's disarmament agenda. I want to pay tribute to the Chairman of this negotiation, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and to the participating countries which have made positive contributions to the rolling text.

But now is not the time to rest on the progress that has been made to date. The international community has very high expectations. We consider that this Committee should build on last year's successful resolution by urging — unanimously, we hope — rapid progress on the Conference. We believe that the General Assembly should stand ready to adopt the text as soon as it is completed — before its fiftieth session, we hope.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will be a major milestone on the way to achieving a situation wherein steps towards negotiating the total elimination of nuclear weapons could be contemplated. In the meantime we greatly value the restraint being shown by most of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of nuclear testing. China's continued testing, by contrast, is a matter of concern and disappointment to the New Zealand Government.

While the nettle has been grasped in the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations, other important questions that flow from the NPT — questions such as security assurances and measures to control fissile material for weapons — cannot continue to be deferred.

New Zealand's view is that the nuclear-weapon States must take steps to increase confidence among non-nuclear-weapon States that are committed to the non-proliferation cause. To this end, we favour the negotiation of common security assurances as the basis for a legally binding international instrument. We were particularly pleased to hear the Secretary-General's endorsement of this approach in his statement to the Committee yesterday. This is an issue on which progress can and should be made in the period immediately ahead.

Neither should we delay negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes — a goal that had unanimous support in the General Assembly last session. We offer our full support to the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament in his continuing efforts to secure agreement on a mandate so that negotiations may begin.

A final point on nuclear weapons must be made. We believe that all NPT parties must play their part if we are to be well prepared for the 1995 Conference. Ensuring compliance with the Treaty is fundamental to its credibility. But in the recent past both Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have, in quite unacceptable terms, challenged the NPT regime and cast a long shadow over security in the Middle East and north-east Asia respectively.

Let us hope that these problems are behind us, because there are more positive developments to record in other parts of the world. Cuba's recent announcement of an intention to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco means that that instrument will soon enter into force for the entire Latin American region. We welcome that, as well as the fact that the African nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty is expected to be adopted in the first half of 1995. When the South Pacific nuclear-free zone and the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty are taken into account, the geographical area in which nuclear weapons are now eschewed is substantial.

In seeking new disarmament and arms-control goals, we should not neglect the need to strengthen and ensure the effective implementation of what we already have. Conventions dealing with weapons of mass destruction must be able to withstand the continuing threat of proliferation. This is as true for the NPT as for the Convention on biological and toxin weapons and our newest negotiating success — the Convention on chemical weapons.

In a special session the Conference of States parties to the Convention on biological and toxin weapons recently agreed to begin in January a process aimed at strengthening its ability to verify the ban on development, production and stockpiling. New Zealand would like to see this process build on the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on verification (VEREX), with the aim of producing a legally binding instrument that could be submitted to the 1996 review Conference.

The ongoing work in The Hague in preparation for the entry into force of the Convention on chemical weapons is of equal significance. Work is currently under way on legislation that would put New Zealand in a position to ratify this Treaty.

Important as these multilateral efforts are, effective action to combat proliferation begins at home. National implementation of non-proliferation commitments must go to our borders and must, we believe, include export-licensing provisions to ensure that commercial trade may continue but without putting at risk the arms-control objectives of the relevant treaties.

Regional perceptions of a threat underlie many of the most complex and tenacious problems on the disarmament and arms-control agenda. In the context of the NPT and even of the Convention on biological and toxin weapons, continuing mutual suspicion remains one of the reasons for the fact that these Treaties have yet to achieve universal adherence. We cannot avoid addressing these realities.

In this context, New Zealand is pleased to be involved in some of the first efforts in the Asia-Pacific region to take stock, on a region-wide basis, of the new realities of its security situation and to plan for the future. In July this year the Regional Forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations met for the first time. The meeting took place in Bangkok. The gathering was a unique occasion. Eighteen Asia-Pacific countries met for the first time in an official capacity to exchange views on the region's security.

At this point the Forum does not have the capacity to solve regional security concerns, but it can certainly help to build the right conditions for avoiding tension through confidence-building and preventive diplomacy.

I turn now to the question of conventional weapons. Conventional arms differ from weapons of mass destruction in that they have a greater degree of accepted legitimacy. But such "legitimacy" has given rise to the waste of much blood and treasure. A recent World Bank study tells us that 19 million people have died in international and civil wars since 1945 — since the founding of this Organization. The majority of these people were civilians.

The level of conventional arms in most regions of the world is extraordinarily high and, by any rational assessment, far exceeds what is required for legitimate security needs. The levels are such that the stockpiles themselves can constitute a source of tension and insecurity. For this reason confidence-building measures are very important.

Our work in this field has to be practical. It is for this reason that New Zealand, from the start, has given strong support to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This has the potential to diminish threat perceptions through greater transparency surrounding the flow of arms. New Zealand believes that the first priority of the Register must be to consolidate what we have achieved and to secure the widest possible participation. We also support expansion of the Register to include production and stockpiles, as well as transfers. We believe that the differences that exist as to how it should be developed can be resolved through further work by a group of governmental experts and in the Conference on Disarmament.

At its session last year the General Assembly saw a welcome increase in the momentum for tighter controls on anti-personnel land-mines. New Zealand's objective for the review of the inhumane weapons Convention is a tougher regime of controls on the use and transfer of mines, with effective verification and compliance provisions. Moreover, given the frequency with which parties to non-international armed conflict have resorted to the use of mines, it is crucial that the revised Convention extend to such situations. That being said, we also welcome proposals which may be pursued outside the regime of the inhumane weapons Convention for fast-track interim measures. Such steps should of course be consistent with, and complementary to, the Convention, and should avoid duplication.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to the unanimous decision of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session to urge the Conference on Disarmament to reach an early consensus on the expansion of its membership by the start of the 1994 session of the Conference. That did not happen. Nor has any progress been made this year — a fact that was noted in the Conference's own report to the General Assembly.

Faced with this impasse, we believe that the time has come for the General Assembly to step in. The current membership of the Conference was composed to suit a past era, and solutions which meet the disarmament and arms control needs of today's world are essential. A negotiating body such as the Conference should reflect all points of view in its composition. We hope that we can count on the support of the broad membership of the First Committee.

**Mr. Yarka** (Papua New Guinea): On behalf of my delegation I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this very important Committee. Our congratulations are also extended to the other members of the Bureau. Allow me also to convey, through you, our sincere appreciation and gratitude to Ambassador Adolf von Wagner of Germany, who diligently guided the work of the Committee during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I wish to assure you of the full support and cooperation of the delegation of Papua New Guinea delegation in the discharge of your important duties.

The end of the cold war considerably reduced global tension and created new opportunities for the United Nations to further enhance and promote positive and constructive development in order to ensure long-term peace and security. However, we believe that it has not yet brought the global peace and security we had hoped for despite some positive developments in various parts of the world. The world seems to be drawn daily into an expanding pattern of regional conflict, ethnic strife and internal violence. As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, we have to reassess our achievements and failures in this important area and emphasize the significance of meeting the challenges that confront us all.

The delegation of Papua New Guinea supports the idea — already put forward on previous occasions — that the work of the First Committee should be rationalized and its agenda reformed. We also believe it is essential that the resolutions adopted by the Committee should evolve towards more binding juridical norms which will effectively strengthen international peace and security.

Papua New Guinea is totally committed to the cause of promoting and maintaining both regional and international peace and stability. We are therefore working very closely with our neighbours, particularly the South Pacific countries and the States members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to collectively put in place arrangements that would further strengthen both regional and global efforts, including all other confidence-building measures.

Papua New Guinea is a signatory to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the purposes and principles of which were endorsed at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly. We believe that international recognition of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation is of great significance because it gives weight to the Treaty as the basis of a peaceful regional order, not just for South-East Asia but for the broader Asia-Pacific region. The Treaty also serves as an example of the way in which regional countries can contribute, in conjunction with the United Nations, towards the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

In the Pacific region also the Governments of the region have collectively put in place a number of arrangements which further strengthen both regional and international efforts to promote and enhance peace and security. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), for instance, is a major achievement in the promotion of regional and international peace and security. This Treaty derived from a need and desire on the part of the countries of the region to protect their environment from any external threat of nuclear armament and war. We wish to reiterate the importance of accession by all nuclear-weapon States to the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga in order to provide meaning and to show leadership and commitment on the part of these States in the achievement of the overall objectives of the disarmament regime.

We also believe that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones would assist in the strengthening of security and could significantly contribute to stability in all parts of the world. In this regard, we welcome Cuba's intention to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the efforts of the African countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the African region.

The recent South Pacific Forum in Brisbane, Australia, among others, reaffirmed its support for the negotiation of a convention to ban the importation into

Forum island countries of hazardous wastes and to control their transboundary movement and management within the South Pacific region, and it welcomed the progress made in that regard. The concept was initiated by Papua New Guinea and it is anticipated that the convention will come into force by 1995. We would welcome the support of the international community, particularly nuclear-weapon States, in promoting such an arrangement.

We welcome the continuing increase in the number of States adhering to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and we hope that the 1995 Review Conference will be able to come up with a feasible compromise that would ensure that the purposes and principles of the NPT and those of the international community are adequately reflected and addressed.

My delegation believes that nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest threats to worldwide peace and security, and that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear arms thus represent one of the most serious challenges, requiring continuous attention and commitment on the part of all States Members of the United Nations. Therefore, strengthening the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system constitutes the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We are pleased to note that with the accession of China and France, all permanent members of the Security Council will have underwritten the NPT, thus helping further to achieve the universality of the Treaty. It is therefore imperative that those States that have not yet acceded to the Treaty should seriously consider doing so.

Papua New Guinea is also of the firm view that the single most important measure yet to be taken in the process of nuclear disarmament is the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We believe this should be the measure of highest priority for the achievement of the global objectives of nuclear disarmament.

My delegation further believes that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is essential in the prevention of the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is now a growing recognition of the need for restraint in the development of new and more powerful nuclear weapons. Furthermore, there is an increasing realization that a cessation of nuclear-weapons testing would contribute to non-proliferation as well as to the achievement of environmental objectives and considerations. My delegation fully supports the current negotiations and we are confident that these negotiations will lead to a successful conclusion.

The maintenance and enhancement of international security require all States to contribute to arms limitation and disarmament measures and to display responsible behaviour in international affairs.

States should demonstrate respect for international peace and security by engaging in appropriate measures of arms control, arms reduction and confidence-building, including respect for international commitments with regard to the agreed measures for nuclear disarmament.

The Papua New Guinea delegation is convinced that one of the requirements in the new political environment is for the leadership of all countries to assume responsibility for seeking the objective of increased international security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces; in particular, those States having the largest nuclear arsenals can contribute to nuclear disarmament.

Finally, in the long term we believe that democracy and development are two importantfactors in redressing dangerous situations in regions and countries where the rule of law is faulty and where huge social and economic imbalances persist. The need for the promotion of a fair and equitable international order would no doubt serve as a catalyst to facilitate lasting peace and security.

The United Nations should therefore play a leading role in ensuring that the objectives of the Charter are achieved, particularly the objectives of lasting peace and security in every part of our global village.

**Mr. Blomberg** (Finland): Let me first congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this important Committee. I pledge my delegation's full support to you in the exercise of your chairmanship.

Let me begin by saying that Finland supports the positions presented in the statement made by the representative of Germany on behalf of the European Union yesterday in this debate.

With the demise of the cold-war confrontation, the emphasis in today's arms control and disarmament lies increasingly on non-proliferation and on measures conducive to conflict prevention, management and post-conflict healing. Dealing with the excess military capacity accumulated during the cold-war years still present a formidable challenge.

At the same time, the post-cold-war international situation provides a unique opportunity to conclude some long-standing items on the international disarmament agenda, particularly the item concerning a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Finland also looks forward to further nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia in the context of the START process. Sooner or later, all nuclear-weapon States must join the nuclear disarmament process. Naturally, we prefer it to happen sooner rather than later.

Arms-control treaties and the aim of seeking universal adherence to them have gained added significance. So has the need to insist on compliance with existing commitments as well and on effective verification of actual compliance. Continued non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its treaty obligations is a case in point.

International agreements on arms control and disarmament establish norms for responsible behaviour. It is vital for the security of all Member States that the United Nations is there to act in accordance with its Charter if faced with grave violations of multilateral disarmament agreements.

Besides a credible framework of arms-control agreements, cooperative security calls for measures that increase confidence between States and, in the regional context, reduce the risk of conflict by misinformation or miscalculation. Furthermore, cooperative security clearly benefits from increased openness and transparency in military matters, regionally and globally.

A particularly gruesome problem is that of the millions of mines scattered in conflict areas throughout the world. The international community must help de-mine the killing fields. It must also prevent future indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel land-mines. That can best be done by strengthening Protocol II of the inhumane weapons Convention.

In one way or another, these issues are all on the agenda of this Committee. We will comment in more detail, as appropriate, on these and other issues in the context of the relevant thematic discussions.

In 1992, the Security Council unanimously, and at the highest political level, stated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security.

As pointed out by my Foreign Minister, Mr. Haavisto, when he addressed the General Assembly some three weeks ago, the Security Council

> "thus affirmed the fundamental norm first established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) a quarter of a century ago. The almost universal adherence to the NPT demonstrates that the world now shares a common interest in its continued existence." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 4th meeting, p. 19)*

Finland believes, as do many other States parties, that the existence of the NPT must be secured through its indefinite and unconditional extension next year.

The preparatory process of the 1995 NPT Conference is on the home straight. While good progress has been made, key procedural issues remain to be solved. The fourth, and last, session of the Preparatory Committee in January will have to agree on the remaining issues. As in the case of previous sessions, if not more so, the Chairman of the fourth session will need to prepare the ground well, and well in advance.

The NPT Western Group has put forward a representative of my country, Ambassador Patokallio, as its candidate for the chairmanship of the fourth session. He enjoys broad support among the States parties. We look forward to his endorsement by the States parties in the very near future.

Finland welcomes the significant progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty since last January. The negotiations so far have brought out the complexity of the task, in particular regarding the effective verification of the future treaty. But it has also become clear that these complexities can be overcome. Finland is making its contribution to these negotiations through its scientific and technical expertise on both seismic and non-seismic verification.

We look forward to the rapid conclusion of a treaty that will finally put a stop to all nuclear-test explosions in all environments for all time. It is high time indeed.

The existing nuclear-testing moratoriums provide an important backdrop to the negotiations in Geneva. It is therefore with deep regret that my Government has learned that, for the second time this year, China has carried out a nuclear test. We once again urge China to refrain from any

further testing and to join the other nuclear-weapon States in a moratorium.

A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, the so-called cut-off treaty, would be another breakthrough in nuclear disarmament. We regret that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to agree on a mandate for the cut-off negotiations and thus live up to the expectations endorsed in resolution 48/75 L.

In his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General points out that:

"Despite continued threats to international peace and security in different parts of the world, cooperation on disarmament was not only maintained but significantly enhanced by concerted actions and initiatives of Member States." *(A/49/1, para. 740)*

Finland fully concurs with this assessment. The First Committee of the General Assembly offers all Member States a forum in which to respond to the challenges of the multilateral disarmament and arms control agenda. Finland, for one, is ready to cooperate with all other Member States in meeting that challenge.

*The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.*

United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.5

# General Assembly
Forty-ninth session

*Official Records*

## First Committee
5th Meeting
Tuesday, 18 October 1994, 3 p.m.
New York

*Chairman*: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . . (Ecuador)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.*

**Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153** (*continued*)

**General debate on all disarmament and international security items**

**Mr. Wyzner** (Poland): I should like to join other speakers in extending warm congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, on your election, and to pledge to you our full cooperation. With your experience and expertise, and with the able assistance of the other officers of the First Committee, I am confident that you will lead us successfully through our important deliberations.

I should also like to express my deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, for his dedication to, and efforts in, revitalizing the work of the First Committee. And, if I may add a personal note, it gives me particular pleasure to appear again in the friendly environment of the First Committee as a representative of my country after years of service as an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

My delegation has listened very carefully to the general debate in the General Assembly, which closed last week. Speaker after speaker voiced their assessments, hopes and fears with regard to current international developments. Disarmament on a global scale attracted the attention of many States. This reflected the importance the international community attaches to this issue.

The disarmament and arms-control process will continue to contribute to the strengthening of international security as long as military threats to security exist. In order to make such a contribution as effective and valuable as possible, one has first of all to consider the nature and scope of these threats.

Traditional arms control requires redefinition to include security cooperation extending to a whole spectrum of issues, embracing both new challenges and the legacy of the cold war.

Unfortunately, that legacy is still present: enormous quantities of weapons, now redundant, are available for sale or transfer. A still-powerful military machine can influence political choices and decisions. The problem of conversion is much more complicated than we originally thought. Scientific and technological assets require safe redeployment; fissionable materials require careful control. The danger of nuclear proliferation is accompanied by the danger of nuclear pollution.

New challenges involving military security stem first of all from regional conflicts, whose root causes have been overshadowed in the past by the bipolar division of the world and by ideological confrontation. Speaking in general terms, one may conclude that although a global military conflict is far less probable now, at the same time military conflicts limited in scope pose a new and difficult challenge.

The focus in the global arms-control process must thus be adjusted accordingly and complemented and reinforced by regional undertakings. In line with the trend in political relations, it must also be more of a cooperative, and not just of a restrictive, nature.

94-86726 (E)

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

The end of the cold war opened the way for unparalleled cooperation and progress across the range of disarmament issues, but it has also unleashed new threats of weapons proliferation. Bearing in mind the changing nature and scale of military threats to security, we need to recognize the fact that disarmament and arms control alone cannot provide for security, which is multidimensional in character. However, disarmament and arms control can reduce the risk of an outbreak of military conflict, raise the level of confidence and provide a better basis for progress in other aspects of security. We need to look at our disarmament agenda with these points in mind. It is therefore the notion of conflict prevention, based on the comprehensive concept of security, which has to provide a conceptual framework and guiding principles for the development of arms control and disarmament.

All in all, the disarmament process has been on track, although it has not yet developed as dynamically as one could wish. We expect that disarmament measures, both those already agreed to and those for which we are still striving, will contribute to the strengthening of global security and to the stability of all regions, including our own, Europe. Poland naturally pays particular attention to the development of regional and subregional cooperation in Europe, both bilaterally and within the framework of the Visegrad Group, the Group of Baltic States and the Central European Initiative. Within this framework and as an active member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Poland is working towards the establishment of a system that would provide security to all European countries. In this context, joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and achieving full membership in the European Union and Western European Union remain our priorities.

The Polish delegation welcomes the outcome of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly the encouraging results of the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty. The progress reported in this respect was possible because of the political will, determination and constructive cooperation of all members of the Conference.

Much of the credit for this accomplishment goes to Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and to the Chairmen of its two Working Groups. The results of the ensuing negotiations represent a good basis on which to pursue the goal of a universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. As a result, the international community stands the chance, long overdue, of securing a good treaty.

We are confident that given the envisaged inter-sessional work, the Conference on Disarmament will be well prepared in 1995 to proceed to intensive, systematic and purpose-oriented negotiations to produce a broadly supported draft comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible. Poland is determined to make a constructive contribution to this end. We lend our full support to the recommendation contained in the report of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban be reestablished at the outset of the 1995 session of the Conference with its present negotiating mandate. Let me add that in view of the significance we attach to this question, my delegation wishes to reserve its right to comment at greater length on the negotiating process with regard to the comprehensive test-ban treaty at a later stage of our debate.

We find it disappointing that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolution 48/75 L on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices — which was adopted by consensus — the Conference on Disarmament has failed to sustain and to follow up on the consensus. While members of the Conference were unanimous in their agreement that the Conference was indeed the appropriate forum in which to negotiate such a treaty, and while there was agreement in principle that an ad hoc committee should be established in that respect, the inflexibility of some Conference members concerning the mandate of such a body has unfortunately proved insurmountable.

We support efforts to work out the mandate for negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissionable material for military purposes. On the basis of the consensus resolution 48/75 L, the Conference on Disarmament constitutes the right framework for such negotiations. We believe that a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be an important factor in the international security structure. In synergistic combination with the comprehensive test-ban treaty, it would contribute greatly to consolidating the global non-proliferation regime, with important implications for nuclear disarmament and related areas.

The international community has recently been alarmed by numerous incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. All these incidents have been small in

scale, and the confiscated nuclear material did not necessarily originate from stockpiles of nuclear weapons. However, the frequency of these incidents and the risks associated with them should compel the international community to take up coordinated efforts to eliminate such occurrences. As Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrzej Olechowski, emphasized in his statement to the General Assembly on 27 September 1994, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials "is a threat to international security and also a danger to bystanders exposed to radiation". There have recently been intensive international discussions, coordinated by Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concerning this objective, and I understand the Secretary-General and Mr. Blix met this morning to discuss these issues. In this connection, we fully support the plans of IAEA to intensify assistance to its member States in this domain and to examine new options for the verification and analysis of reported incidents of illicit trafficking and for enhanced physical protection. In the light of that examination, the international community should determine whether the existing international legal regime in question requires further strengthening. Its thorough review seems timely.

As a country bordering regions where nuclear arms are stored, Poland has a direct interest in a satisfactory international arrangement governing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. We believe that such assurances are reasonably expected by those who have solemnly forsworn the nuclear option and who comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or other comparable, internationally binding agreements.

We hope, therefore, that the Conference on Disarmament will eventually be able to reach a satisfactory solution of the question of effective international arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In particular, we have high hopes for the ongoing consultations among nuclear-weapon States on possible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It cannot be denied that enhancing confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon States about their security would go a long way towards the creation of a much more favourable environment in the progress towards global disarmament and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Our country has actively participated in the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference on the review and extension of the NPT. Judging by the progress made so far, we believe it is realistic to expect a timely solution to all the outstanding problems related to the Conference. Poland is among those States parties that stand for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, which would strengthen its impact as a mainstay of the non-proliferation regime and a major factor in international security. In our view, nothing less should be expected from the review and extension Conference next April. Its final outcome must not be regarded in terms of a trade-off or favour rendered by one group of States to another.

By indefinitely extending the NPT, mankind would be doing itself a favour. This would also, in our view, provide the necessary basis for further progress in nuclear disarmament and for unobstructed cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Of course, as is clear from our references to the ongoing international negotiations in the field of arms control, we hope that the extension of the Treaty will take place against the background of continuing meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the preamble and article VI of the Treaty.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament shows that little progress was made in 1994 on the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space. We are certainly among those who believe that with the demise of the cold war, this issue has lost its sharp edge. Yet we firmly believe that one worthwhile area that could be usefully explored by the Conference on Disarmament is that of confidence-building in relation to the activities of States in outer space. By enhancing transparency, confidence and especially security, such confidence-building measures as space-launch notifications and "rules of the road" in orbit could be usefully pursued.

Poland supported and became one of the original sponsors of the resolution establishing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. We also support the gradual expansion of the scope of the Register. Poland attaches great importance to the question of transparency in armaments, which has been demonstrated, *inter alia*, by comprehensive and timely submissions to the first and the second annual Register. Such action enhances confidence, eases tensions and promotes regional and global security.

Poland has all along advocated the further expansion of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a premise for its universalization, which is indispensable. This purpose, in our view, would be served, *inter alia*, by a voluntary exchange of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Combined with the conventional arms transfers, it would go a long way towards the more balanced and non-discriminatory instrument we seek.

Two years ago, the adoption of the chemical weapons Convention was heralded as a remarkable achievement of the Conference on Disarmament. Active preparations for the entry into force of the Convention and its implementation are taking place in the framework of the Preparatory Commission. A great deal of useful work has already been done. We have noticed, however, that the pace of the work is losing its momentum. As the Secretary-General appealed to us yesterday, we should not permit this. We are so close to transforming words into deeds by starting the actual process of completely eliminating chemical weapons from the Earth.

It is our firm view that the early entry into force of the Convention is in the best interest of all. We are fully committed to this goal. Last year, for instance, Poland organized a regional seminar on national implementation measures for countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We have concluded governmental procedures and have submitted a proposal for the ratification of the Convention to the Parliament. We hope that Poland will soon join those States which have already ratified the Convention.

For years this body has played an active role in encouraging the Conference on Disarmament to finalize negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. It should continue this role by promoting its early entry into force. For this reason, Poland, together with Canada, our traditional co-sponsor, is working on a draft resolution on this subject, which we expect to submit to the Committee shortly.

A smooth commencement of the effective implementation of the Convention and of the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will provide, we believe, useful guidance for other areas of disarmament and a valuable testing ground. I have in mind in particular the biological weapons Convention and the recently concluded special conference to consider the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. Poland welcomes the decision of the Conference to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and to draft proposals for strengthening the Convention. Like other countries, we share the view that the lack of an effective verification mechanism is obviously a serious deficiency of the biological weapons Convention. The complex nature of different aspects of such a verification regime calls for a proper balance between sometimes conflicting requirements: intrusiveness and the protection of confidential information being just one obvious example.

In the meantime, we should not lose anything of the positive achievements collected so far in the process of implementation of a set of confidence-building measures in this area. Apart from playing an independent role in increasing the transparency of activities relevant from the point of view of the biological weapons Convention, these measures can also be regarded as an invaluable trial exercise in preparation for the future verification regime. A critical analysis of returns shows that there is still room for improvement in these measures, in particular in terms of a level of participation, but equally from the point of view of a common interpretation of what is to be reported.

We should not fail to mention yet another area closely related to disarmament efforts: international humanitarian law, and especially the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The experiences of recent years has made it manifestly clear that this Convention is inadequate.

Poland attaches particular importance to the issue of land-mines, an issue of truly global character. We firmly support a speedy solution to the problem of anti-personnel land-mines laid down throughout the entire planet. The knowledge that hundreds of innocent victims are being killed or maimed every week by these deadly "seeds of war" will not permit us to give up the struggle — and time is not on our side.

The Polish people know perfectly well the deadly effects of mines and the price to be paid for mine clearance. About 90 million unexploded munitions, mainly land-mines, had to be destroyed on our territory after the Second World War. An additional aspect of this deadly legacy relates to incidents with land-mines involving international personnel serving in peace-keeping operations. Our Government is fully aware of the high risk to which United Nations Blue Helmets, including hundreds of Polish peace-keepers, are increasingly exposed.

It is our sincere hope that next year's first Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on inhuman weapons will strengthen the regime of its Protocol II on land-mines and provide a basis for a more nearly universal application of the Convention. Poland was among the sponsors of last year's General Assembly resolution 48/75 K on a moratorium on the export of land-mines. Consequently, we maintain a policy of restraint in exporting these deadly items. The process of introducing relevant national legal regulations is already under way in my country.

Finally, on the issue of the composition of the Conference on Disarmament, Poland takes the position that it would be in the best interests of the future efficiency and credibility of the Conference if the stalemate over the expansion of its membership were no longer allowed to continue. Poland is hopeful that a breakthrough in that regard will prove possible at an early stage of the 1995 session.

In my brief statement I have touched upon only a few disarmament issues. This debate has demonstrated how rich the disarmament agenda is and will remain for the immediate future. We should approach it with resolve and a sense of priority. May I express my delegation's confidence that, together, we will spare no effort to use the opportunity created by a new international environment for the advancement of the cause of disarmament and arms control and for the sake of international peace and security on both the global and the regional scale.

**Mr. Türk** (Slovenia): Let me congratulate you, Sir, and other members of the Bureau on your election. We are convinced that your abilities and expertise guarantee a successful continuation of the work of the First Committee. Allow me, too, to take this opportunity to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, for his outstanding performance during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

In recent years, we have witnessed remarkable activity in the mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security. Furthermore, the restoration of democracy in much of the world, accompanied by an overwhelming awareness of shared responsibility for global security, has laid new foundations for a more efficient management of international security issues.

However, the current international security environment is far from being entirely satisfactory. Some conflicts, inherited from the past, still persist. In addition, the security situation in many parts of the world has deteriorated, owing to more recent outbursts of hostilities. The ratio between the number of new or continuing conflicts and that of successfully prevented or resolved ones remains disturbing. This indicates that further efforts need to be made towards finding improved ways of preventing and resolving conflicts.

Preventive diplomacy is certainly one of the tools which could have been utilized more often and with greater effect. Its potential, deriving from the non-coercive nature of its methods, has been far from exhausted. In principle, preventive action should be taken prior to the deterioration of a given situation into an open dispute and long before it becomes a situation involving a threat to international peace and security. Only in these circumstances can such action be successful. The role of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council should be developed further in this domain.

Among other United Nations organs, the General Assembly should be able to address situations which may impair the general welfare of or friendly relations among nations and to recommend appropriate measures for their peaceful adjustment. Thus, circumstances would be created to prevent such situations from evolving into open disputes or conflicts. Successful preventive action could thereby significantly reduce the number of situations which would otherwise require a coercive approach. It would also relieve the growing pressure on the limited resources of the United Nations.

Regional security mechanisms and cooperation between regional arrangements and the United Nations represent other possibilities for strengthening international security which should be developed beyond their present scope. Slovenia has been participating actively in the development of the mechanisms of cooperative security within our region, Europe, and in particular within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is our firm conviction that regional security arrangements, including confidence-building and disarmament arrangements, are an important integral part of comprehensive global security. In this connection, Slovenia emphasizes the importance of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission last year and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/75 G of 16 December 1993. In particular, we emphasize the practical relevance of such principles as that requiring regional arrangements to be freely agreed upon by the participating States. Furthermore, the region to which the arrangements among them apply should be defined appropriately, taking into account its specific conditions and characteristics.

Slovenia is aware of the security needs of contemporary Europe. We are convinced that the full integration of Slovenia in the existing regional security structures in Europe would contribute significantly to fulfilling these needs. It would increase the level of regional security and consolidate the area of stability. Slovenia has already joined the Partnership for Peace programme with a view to becoming a member of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the course of strengthening our ties with the European Union, we wish to obtain as early as possible the status of associate member of the Western European Union. The early integration of Slovenia into these structures will represent a contribution to the overall strengthening of security in Europe and, consequently, to global security.

Turning to the disarmament questions, I wish to address first the issue of conventional weapons. International action in the field of conventional arms has to be further intensified. While the continuing existence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction poses the most serious threat to mankind, we should not neglect the growing threat of the ever-more sophisticated conventional weapons. Decisive steps should be taken to reduce the human suffering caused by the use of certain categories of these weapons.

In this regard, Slovenia strongly supports the existing moratoria on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. Furthermore, we are willing to cooperate with other interested delegations in pursuit of the initiative presented by the United States to conclude an agreement on reducing the number and availability of anti-personnel land-mines with a view to their eventual elimination. The international community has to pool its resources in order to eliminate the threat posed to the civilian population by mines and other unexploded devices, especially after the end of armed conflicts.

One of the major achievements in the area of global security is undoubtedly the creation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. As a step towards greater transparency in armaments it represents an important and precious contribution to confidence-building on a global scale. However, we should not refrain from making it into an ever more reliable instrument. This could be achieved by enhancing the reporting system and by expanding its inventory. We believe that it should include procurement through national production and that adequate steps should be taken to ensure universal and comprehensive reporting. Such reporting would most likely be greatly encouraged if appropriate verification measures were to be introduced.

The present session of the General Assembly is taking place at a time of intensive preparations for the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On numerous occasions, Slovenia has expressed its conviction that the NPT should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

It is widely acknowledged that, in parallel, substantial progress in negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and concrete steps to ensure effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would greatly contribute to the positive outcome of the 1995 NPT Conference.

We support the initiatives for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In this regard, we commend Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for the establishment of a working group within the IAEA secretariat to examine the verification arrangements for such a treaty.

International efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation may also be threatened by the illicit trafficking in nuclear material. We welcome the initiative to examine the options available for strengthening the role of the IAEA in improving the control, supervision and physical protection of such material.

No efforts should be spared to strengthen the endeavours with a view to complete nuclear disarmament. We appreciate the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to accelerate the mutual reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons. In addition, we support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, wherever possible, as they clearly represent an efficient and practical way to achieve nuclear disarmament.

As a result of developments in recent years, the ultimate goal — the elimination of weapons of mass destruction — seems to be closer. The chemical weapons Convention has an unprecedented number of States signatories and the number of ratifications is steadily increasing. Slovenia is determined to ratify this Convention at the earliest possible date.

With the recent establishment of an ad hoc group to strengthen the biological weapons Convention, revived international activities seem to encompass all the aspects of the process of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. In order to proceed smoothly along this path, the United Nations should promote further cooperation among Member States in its organs and, especially, in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, we wish to associate ourselves with the initiatives for the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the most

appropriate solution to this issue would be the inclusion of all interested peaceful States as full members. We welcome the support given to this approach by the European Union in its statement yesterday.

Let me conclude this statement with a few more remarks regarding a specific situation which demonstrates the inherent link between security and disarmament issues. Military conflicts and political tensions which involve several States in the Balkans created the need for steps to be taken to end the conflicts and to develop appropriate measures for post-conflict confidence-building. The continued war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the precarious situation in parts of Croatia are the most acute examples of the many aspects of the problem and must be addressed urgently.

First of all, the parties directly or indirectly involved in the armed conflicts must be persuaded to negotiate with a view to the definitive cessation of hostilities. After putting an end to hostilities, these negotiations should include confidence- and security-building measures, the reduction of armaments, a decrease in armed forces, the disbandment and/or subordination of paramilitary forces and demobilization. These objectives should be an integral part of the peace plan.

The successful conclusion of this first phase would create the necessary conditions for the second phase of negotiations, when the States in the immediate vicinity of an area of conflict, and other States concerned, would join the participants of the first phase and assist them in concluding arrangements for comprehensive arms limitation and the reduction of armed forces. This second phase could also include additional confidence- and security-building measures to be taken by all participating States.

This is just one example of a situation involving a clear need for a combination of diplomatic efforts to end a military conflict on the one hand and of disarmament and confidence-building measures on the other.

We have addressed several security and disarmament issues which figure prominently on the international agenda. We believe that the General Assembly has an important contribution to make with regard to all of them and that the current debate in the First Committee is especially important in this context.

**Mr. Gorita** (Romania): Let me first, on behalf of the delegation of Romania, congratulate the Chairman wholeheartedly on his election to steer the work of the First Committee. Our congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau. I would like to use this opportunity also to pay tribute to the Chairman's predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, especially for his efforts with a view to the rationalization of the work of the Committee.

There have been profound changes in the international political environment in the last five years. With the radical changes in Eastern Europe, more than four decades of adverse ideological and military competition between East and West came to an end, thus creating unprecedented opportunities for substantive progress in security, arms control and disarmament. Substantial progress has been made on various long-standing issues, particularly with regard to the reduction of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The successful implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces, and other initiatives such as the reduction and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic-arms-reduction agreements, including START I and START II, represent significant contributions to halting the spread of nuclear arms. The trilateral agreement signed last January between the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine provided, *inter alia*, for the elimination of all nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. The conclusion last year of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was a tremendous success for the multilateral negotiating efforts of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament.

The renunciation of the use of force and the full-scale operation of the system of collective security seem to be closer to implementation than ever. The revival of the United Nations in keeping with its natural vocation as defined by the Charter, the increasing roles of the General Assembly and, especially, of the Security Council, and the strengthening of regional structures appear to confirm the growing ascendancy of political over military factors.

Romania supports firmly the strengthening of the United Nations and the multilateral system for the safeguarding of peace world wide. The United Nations and regional institutions have a decisive role to play, especially in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, and in promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law and closer cooperation among regions.

In Europe, the shape of a new security architecture is developing on the basis of freedom and stability. Confidence-building measures have greatly contributed to the reduction of offensive and destabilizing military capabilities and have paved the way for new cooperative approaches towards security. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provides valuable forums for security cooperation and preventive diplomacy. Along those lines, the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies contributes to regional stability, while the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe establishes a new military balance at a substantially lower level of armaments. The profound changes in this part of the world, where confrontation was most sharp in the past, are also illustrated by the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace programme of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in which my country is playing an active part. The European Union and the Western European Union are expanding in both membership and scope. Through their cooperation and interaction and in continuous dialogue with the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO and the Western European Union are developing the network of a cooperative regional security system.

We also see similar significant tendencies and developments in other regions of the world, and we welcome them. Last summer's meeting in Bangkok of the Regional Forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was of historic significance, and established a framework of political and security dialogue and confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region. A treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone is being finalized, and it appears that the Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America — the Treaty of Tlatelolco — will enter into force soon. The peace process in the Middle East has entered a new, higher stage.

Despite these encouraging results, we cannot ignore the persistence and even the exacerbation of situations which threaten international security. The tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is but one example. The post-cold-war situation is characterized by potential regional arms races and by the accumulation of ever more destructive weaponry by a growing number of countries. Regional instabilities, the emergence of ethnic and religious tensions and the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional arms have created a real challenge to international stability, rendering disarmament and arms control more urgent and necessary than ever. Because, as the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, rightly said in his introductory statement, disarmament and arms controls are an integral part of security.

The year 1995 will witness three major events in the field of non-proliferation. The review and extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held; the chemical weapons Convention will very probably enter into force; and the biological weapons Convention will again come under scrutiny, by the new negotiating body for the setting up of a verification regime.

Six months from now, the representatives of almost 170 Governments will meet here to decide the fate of the non-proliferation Treaty, an international instrument that has been hailed as the most important pact of the nuclear era, and the cornerstone and the main pillar of the non-proliferation regime that has been carefully built up over the years. The 1995 NPT conference will be a moment of truth, when nations will have to make a fundamental political decision. The only reasonable decision must be in the direction of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Romania stands firmly for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. Such an extension would put a permanent stop to the further spread of nuclear weapons, sending a clear warning to all those who might think of acquiring them.

The Conference should be a forum for joint efforts to obtain both the indefinite extension of the Treaty and its universality, thereby ensuring the promotion of nuclear disarmament and cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the strengthening of the verification regime and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. A treaty of unlimited duration would provide additional assurances of international stability and security, and, under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would permit continued international trade and cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology.

We are now in the final stage of the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference. However, much work remains to be done. My delegation would like to see a rapid resolution of the remaining organizational and procedural issues, since appropriate and timely preparation of the 1995 Conference is the key to the successful conclusion of the review and extension process itself.

Complementary to nuclear non-proliferation are the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against

the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the cut-off of production of fissile materials.

Resolution 48/70, on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, made it clear that the whole international community favoured the early conclusion of such a treaty in order to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the process of nuclear disarmament.

This year, the Conference on Disarmament focused its work on the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Romania welcomes the substantial progress made so far and hopes that, both here and in Geneva, we will use all available time for inter-sessional work to prepare the ground for successful negotiations during the next session.

As we have repeatedly stated in the Conference on Disarmament and other forums, Romania seeks an universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Its verification regime should be international in character and cost-effective, and should offer a baseline capacity to monitor compliance with the provisions of the treaty on a global scale.

The issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been a subject of extensive deliberations at the Conference on Disarmament. Efforts in this direction have to continue so that an arrangement can be reached to complement the benefits of an indefinite extension of the NPT and an effective comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such an arrangement should essentially offer universal and legally binding negative, as well as positive, security assurances that are global in scope, uniform and comprehensive. The search for a solution should not leave the United Nations aside, and we favour the idea of a Security Council confirmation, on a broader basis, of the commitments which were originally undertaken by three nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

The Conference on Disarmament also has to begin negotiations as quickly as possible for the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for explosive nuclear devices.

The conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention was a major success of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. This Convention is generally recognized as the first truly verifiable global disarmament agreement, with a uniquely comprehensive and effective verification regime covering military and non-military facilities. It is in this spirit that the Romanian parliament has initiated the process of ratification of the chemical weapons Convention, and we are confident that my country will be among the first 65 States parties to this agreement.

Over the last two years we have achieved some positive results in improving and strengthening the regime under the 1972 biological weapons Convention. Romania submitted the required data, according to the letter and the spirit of that Convention, for improved confidence-building measures. There is, however, a clear distinction between confidence-building and verification. Romania therefore supported the decision taken by the 1991 Third Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint (VEREX). The Romanian experts took an active part in the work of VEREX, which was successfully accomplished a year ago by the adoption of a consensus report, recommending *inter alia*, some of the potential verification measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the implementation of the Convention. We welcome the successful outcome of the recent Review Conference of the States parties to the biological weapons Convention, and we will actively participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Conference to consider appropriate measures, including a possible verification regime, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument.

Before concluding, let me say a few words about transparency as a means to promote confidence-building among States and to advance disarmament. An important step towards increased transparency was achieved through the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. From the first year my country submitted data for inclusion in the Register and favours its further development, to make it comprehensive, balanced and conducive to universal participation.

Romania also believes that proper attention should be paid to the proposal for a code of conduct in international transfers of conventional arms, aimed at furthering the debate on measures to deal with excessive and destabilizing accumulations of weapons. Such a code could increase openness and transparency in this field by establishing, as a voluntary confidence-building measure, universal and non-discriminatory principles and criteria to be followed by subscribing States in considering arms transfers. A proposal to this effect, submitted by Romania in the Conference on

Disarmament, was welcomed by many delegations, which considered it a potential contribution to the strengthening of confidence and understanding among States and advocated commencement of substantive negotiations on, and the drafting of, such a code. It is my delegation's firm belief that, despite the fact that we have yet a long way to go, such a code of conduct could establish viable universal and non-discriminatory principles and criteria for the regulation of arms transfers, which could significantly help to limit the potential growth of regional tension and to increase stability.

**Mr. Samhan** (United Arab Emirates) (*interpretation from Arabic*): On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, I am pleased to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I am confident that your experience in this field will contribute to the success of the Committee's deliberations. I also wish to congratulate the other members of the Bureau and to wish them every success.

Despite the developments that have taken place on the international arena and the optimism generated by positive international changes since the end of the cold war, and by the participation of the United Nations in peace efforts, in addition to the partial achievements in the field of international security and disarmament, there have emerged new situations that threaten international peace and security, such as increasing national and regional armed conflicts, violations of human rights, ethnic conflicts, and the widening economic and social gaps between developed and developing countries. It is clear that such situations are not conducive to the creation of a sound international environment of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, peace and security. In this context, we wish to stress the fact that in order for us to address these phenomena and deal with these situations, we have to adopt a new approach that could enable us to overcome them in the interest of all humanity.

The new international order, which advocates ridding the world of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction must be founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the prohibition of the use of or threat of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and respect for each State's right to choose its our path of development, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The report of the Secretary-General on the New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era (A/C.1/47/7) has contributed to the exploration of means of promoting international machinery to achieve disarmament and of adapting such machinery to new international realities.

In this regard, we wish to stress the importance of adequate interaction between the different elements of such machinery. Disarmament should be the focus of interest on the part of every State and should be pursued in a manner that serves regional and international peace and security. We also wish to stress the need for the Security Council and the General Assembly to play a positive and effective role in his discussion, in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

My delegation concurs with the call for expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, and for the selection of members on a basis of objectivity and transparency. Representation in the Conference must be universal so that due account may be taken of the concerns of all Members and States of the world.

Universal disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction at the international level are two extremely urgent matters if the world is to rid itself of the remaining residues of the cold war and achieve global peace and security. In this regard, we attach great importance to ensuring the success of the forthcoming Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) scheduled for 1995. The recent voluntary halting of nuclear tests by some nuclear-weapon States is a positive step. We hope that other States that possess such weapons will follow suit.

The State of the United Arab Emirates firmly believes that the issues of peace, security, disarmament and the settlement of disputes and conflicts must be based on a number of cardinal principles, namely peaceful coexistence; non-interference in the internal affairs of States; non-use or threat of use of force as a means of solving disputes and conflicts; the rejection of hegemony, occupation and expansionism; emphasis on the right of each State to sovereignty, independence, respect for its political system and economic and social development in accordance with its development plans and aspirations; and the right of States to safeguard and preserve their natural resources. These are the principles that we abide by in our bilateral, regional and international relations, in consonance with the United Nations Charter and the rules of international law.

Proceeding from these principles, concepts and goals and with a view to ensuring the stability and security that the Gulf region, more than any other region of the world, stands in need of, in view of the wars and conflicts that

took place there over the past two decades, the use, in the course of those conflicts, of various kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and the resultant grave consequences for social and economic development and the environment, the United Arab Emirates, together with sister States in the Gulf Cooperation Council, has called for the resolution of problems and conflicts through dialogue and by peaceful means and had called for strengthening cooperation between the States of the region at both the bilateral and the collective levels in keeping with the principles of peaceful coexistence and good-neighbourliness. The aim is to rebuild confidence and to lay a firm foundation that would guarantee peace and security in the region.

One of the important issues with which the international community must deal, is the problem of mines and other explosive devices in many parts of the world, particularly in the Gulf region. Our territorial waters and the coasts of our islands are still plagued by the legacy of the Iraq-Iran war and the war for the liberation of Kuwait. Mines constitute a danger to people living in the region and to international marine navigation. My delegation is of the view that remedying this situation is a joint international humanitarian responsibility that should be discharged within the framework of dealing with the problems of disarmament and international security.

The United Arab Emirates supports the view that the United Nations, and its specialized agencies as well as regional organizations must have a significant and effective role to play in the field of disarmament, at the regional level. This requires special support from the States that possess nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. My country has always supported peace and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, including the Middle East region, as this would help create conditions that favour the achievement of sustainable development lasting peace and stability.

In this connection, we call upon Israel, as a State that possess nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT and to subject all its nuclear facilities to the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and in harmony with the current peace process in the region.

We attach special importance to the question of enabling the Disarmament Commission to focus its attention on the main and significant items relating to international peace and security and to put forward practical proposals thereon. The Conference on Disarmament should deal with other important matters, such as the confidence-building measures necessary for maintaining peace, as well as stability and regional security arrangements. In addition, organizational structures of the Conference on Disarmament must be adjusted to the new realities of the world.

With the forthcoming fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, the Organization should face up to the challenge of transforming the world into a world of genuine international peace and security.

In this context, we support the call for rationalizing the work of the First Committee and revising its agenda, as well as for taking into account the need for according special attention to the rules and principles that would effectively promote international peace and security. In this regard, we call also for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means — in observance of the principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the norms of international law.

The effects of an unchecked international or regional arms race and the exorbitant price such a race extracts in the form of military outlays, not only threaten international peace and security, but also by a tremendous burden that causes a massive haemorrhage which drains national economic and financial resources, particularly in the developing countries. Consequently, the striving by those countries after disarmament and the resultant reduction of military expenditures would enable them to rechannel their resources and to dedicate and harness their capabilities to the achievement of social and economic development and the strengthening of international and regional peace and security; while we are aware of the fact that regional problems and disputes have their special geographic, political, social, and security characteristics, we also realize that achievement of final solutions to these problems requires the existence of political will and the building of confidence between States, particularly neighbouring States, as well as the development of mechanisms of peaceful settlement of international and regional disputes and conflicts.

In this connection, I wish to refer to the need to promote the role and the work of the International Court of Justice so that it may contribute to the settlement of disputes between States.

In our view, such practice and measure represent the real means of relaxing the tensions that arise from disputes and friction between States and resolving such disputes by peaceful means and not by the use or threat of the use of force or of weapons of mass destruction. This measure will

effectively contribute to creating a sound international environment, that is free from threats and risks, an environment of disarmament, development, security and stability.

**Mr. Camacho Omiste** (Bolivia) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: Mr. Chairman, the Bolivian delegation is pleased indeed to see you presiding over the work of the First Committee. We would also like to express our thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner.

The end of the cold war has restored the hope of mankind that we may be able to live in peace and has committee to the United Nations the historic challenge to lay the foundation for a new century free from the threat of nuclear weapons.

As Members of the United Nations we have the duty to assume a real commitment to bring about total nuclear disarmament through the adoption of legal obligations — not first through speeches and declarations.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has proved to be a basic instrument in our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bolivia gives its full support to ensuring the attainment of its final objective.

In our overall consideration of disarmament, special significance attaches to the nuclear-test-ban Treaty. If this agreement is to be effective, it must be universally applicable and unquestionably verifiable. Its existence will without question constitute an essential element in disarmament.

Bolivia hopes also that further progress will be made in the negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention so that it may soon be possible for it to enter into force.

We support the widespread reduction in military budgets, general disarmament prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes, and transparency in agreements and operations relating to weapons.

In order to ensure strong development, collective security and cooperation among nations, confidence-building measures must include the peaceful, just and timely settlement of questions inherited from the part.

In the opinion of my delegation, the General Assembly should place greater emphasis on controlling the indiscriminate transfer of conventional weapons, unlawful trafficking in such weapons, related activities.

Although we are familiar with the devastating effects of devices that have caused the death of millions in recent conflicts, conventional weapons nevertheless continue to pose a serious threat to the countries represented here.

Bolivia, as a responsible member of the community of nations, is determined to contribute to the elimination of the illicit arms trade, through the implementation of legal measures on the domestic level aimed at implementing initiatives and provisions on the subject deriving from the competent bodies and relevant agreements.

My delegation considers it a matter of priority at this session in the General Assembly to deal with all matters relating to the removal of land-mines and to the imposition of a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines.

Last June — on behalf of the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia, all members of the Cartagena Agreement — we submitted a concrete proposed for the establishment of the special trust fund called for in General Assembly resolution 48/7. The proposal by Andean countries, as set forth in document A/49/357/Add.1, reflects our concern regarding the seriousness of the problems of mines, the indiscriminate use and proliferation of which are clearly an obstacle to security and development.

At the regional level, Bolivia is proud to be part of the Latin American family which, from its own convictions, has created a truly nuclear-free zone. In this way, our region has made a concrete contribution to international peace. Hence, Bolivia supports the efforts that other regions are making to become nuclear-weapon-free zones. Nevertheless, we believe that efforts to ensure a world free from this terrible threat to humanity must receive the speedy support of the international community as a whole, and especially of those States that possess nuclear weapons.

The Government of Bolivia is convinced that we must redouble our efforts to convert or redirect material, financial and human resources towards non-military purposes.

Such a reorientation of efforts will help to promote the progress of mankind. It will help to resolve the urgent social problems of our day, in particular the growing and widespread poverty of the third world.

Progress in scientific research and the available means shared be put to higher uses rather than to mass destruction or war.

We are in favour of life; we are not in favour of death caused by irrationality, hatred or the mistakes of just a few.

These are the basic principles that will guide the delegation of Bolivia in the Committee.

**Mr. Ayewah** (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, the Nigerian delegation is pleased to see you presiding over the affairs of the First Committee at the current session of the General Assembly. Your election is a tribute to you and to your great country, Ecuador. We are confident that with your diplomatic skills, our deliberations will be fruitful. We pledge our full support in ensuring a successful outcome of our work under your leadership. We also congratulate the other officers of the Committee, and wish them a successful tenure in office.

We seize this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Adolf von Wagner of Germany, for the admirable manner in which he guided the work of the Committee during the forty-eighth session. His untiring efforts in relation to the rationalization of the Committee's work are already yielding fruit — in the pattern of the debate and structure of our work during the current session. We look forward to further progress in that area in order to make the Committee respond more appropriately to the challenges of our time.

In a few months we shall be marking the fiftieth anniversary of our Organization. It will be a time for taking stock and for charting the course towards peace and collective security, which must of necessity include the harnessing of existing finite resources for development and the progress of all mankind.

It would be a great achievement for the Organization to be able to say that there is irreversible progress towards the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction; that within the framework of the disarmament agenda of the United Nations, we have been able to reach agreement on the use of technology mainly for peaceful purposes and on the norms for its transfer to developing economies; and, that we have established internationally accepted standards for the production and transfer of conventional weapons. Sadly, this will not be so by 1995. However, we can at this session of the General Assembly adopt a forward-looking disarmament agenda for the period beyond 1995 in which priority is given to these objectives.

In the view of my Government, the elimination of nuclear weapons should be the primary objective of the international community in the field of disarmament. The world must not seek to differentiate between weapons of mass destruction in its efforts to eliminate them. We must move to ban the production and use of these weapons and ultimately to eliminate them.

The decision to be taken at the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is crucial, in that it will indicate whether we are going to make progress or retrogress in the nuclear disarmament agenda, and whether we are going to strengthen the non-proliferation regime or weaken it.

It should not be taken for granted that the year 1995 offers an opportunity to consolidate the non-proliferation Treaty through an unconditional and indefinite extension. An unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty is clearly the easiest way to weaken the nuclear non-proliferation regime because of the inequities of the obligations assumed by the parties and the discriminatory structure of the Treaty. To suggest that indefinite extension of the Treaty is the only option available to parties could be an exercise in disinformation. The possible options provided for in the Treaty should be made clear to States parties, so that they can then take an objective and informed decision. For this reason, the Nigerian delegation would like to see the General Assembly adopt a resolution that will sensitize States parties to the important decision ahead, in order that they may be able to begin, in their various capitals, to give careful consideration to the import of article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. In this regard, we would like a clear legal interpretation of this article, an interpretation devoid of prejudice, subjectivity and high politicization. In addition, my delegation would like to say that forcing an inappropriate decision on extension through manipulation of procedure may well backfire and become costly to progress in disarmament in general.

Other factors that will contribute to the success of the 1995 Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty are: the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-test explosions; a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and their vectors; and a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Requests for these measures are as old as the non-proliferation Treaty itself. Besides the fact that these are legitimate requests, the current international climate favours and enables these measures. Furthermore, there is a need to strike a balance between the safeguards role of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its activities in the area of the transfer of nuclear technology and other promotional activities, so that the "Atoms for Peace" vision behind the non-proliferation Treaty may be fully realized.

Still on the issue of nuclear disarmament, a new and growing concern is the reported illicit traffic in nuclear materials, which negates the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is in the interests of the international community to address this concern in an effective manner.

In the past three years the General Assembly has adopted three widely supported resolutions on transparency in armaments, establishing the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons and recommending consideration of the further development of the Register and the early expansion of its scope to include further categories of equipment and data on military holdings and procurement through national production. The Nigerian delegation is disappointed that the group of governmental experts that met in 1994 to look into this matter was not able to agree on an expansion of the Register as recommended. Every effort should be made to see that the Register achieves the set objectives of full transparency in all types of armaments, and in both transfers and national holdings, in order to enhance its credibility and to keep Member States committed to reporting to the Register.

In 1990 the General Assembly adopted, by consensus, resolution 45/62 A entitled "Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade". The Declaration deals essentially with the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world for lasting peace and security. It recognized the determination of the international community to make progress in the 1990s by resolutely pursuing disarmament along with other efforts necessary for attaining genuine peace and security. It stated that the United Nations would continue to foster multilateral cooperation for disarmament, wherein bilateral and regional efforts could be complementary and mutually supportive in attaining the purposes and principles of its Charter.

We are now at the middle of the Decade and there have been great changes, both positive and negative, since that Declaration. My delegation believes that the international community needs to appraise and review the achievements in the field of disarmament in the light of the proposed objectives in the Declaration and, if need be, adapt its elements to the priority issues of the post-cold-war era. Just as we did at the 1985 session of the Disarmament Commission in respect of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, we wish to propose the inclusion in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission, while still in the middle of the 1990s, of an item entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade".

Before concluding, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction with the progress made in the drafting of the treaty on the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. We look forward to the early conclusion of the treaty and its adoption by concerned members of the international community. In anticipation of this positive development, and taking advantage of the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America, member States of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic adopted a unanimous declaration on the denuclearization of the South Atlantic during their third meeting in Brasilia, Brazil, last month. This development should thus make a large area of the globe denuclearized, and enable the developing countries in that region to devote their energies and resources to development for the benefit of their populations, and thus contribute to the goal of international peace and security. In the same manner, we wish to encourage the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in South Asia.

Finally, the Nigerian delegation would like to draw attention to the problems of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. This Centre needs to be revitalized through the provision to it of resources, both human and material, so that it can perform the role for which it was established, namely, to sensitize and educate African public opinion with regard to the issues of disarmament and the building of confidence among States, as well as the peaceful resolution of disputes and development.

**Mr. Eteffa** (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, I should like to congratulate you and the other members of the Bureau warmly on your election to guide us in our deliberations in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session. My delegation is confident that we will reach a successful and fruitful conclusion under your chairmanship. We assure you of our cooperation and support.

For the last few years we have been congratulating ourselves, declaring the end of the cold war and welcoming the new relaxed and positive international political climate. We have been relatively at ease in our bilateral, regional and international interactions resulting from the positive developments prevailing in the international relations of

States. However, we are still far from reaching our expectations, in view of the emergence of new forms of challenges to international peace and security. Despite the tremendous achievements in the fields of both disarmament and international security, we still face formidable challenges that need to be addressed without further delay. A threat to peace somewhere is, as we always say, a threat to peace and security everywhere.

The recent tragedies in Rwanda, the relatively improved but unresolved situation of Somalia, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and other tragic events expressed in various forms are lessons which tell us that there are always unforeseen but intolerable circumstances posing a threat to centuries of human civilization. Our endeavours to embark on economic and social development after the end of the East-West confrontation are being replaced by efforts to address the symptoms of world disorder in different parts of the globe. Our Organization is currently spending more than $3 billion a year to run the day-to-day activities of the United Nations peace-keepers deployed in the various trouble spots of the world. All these situations send us the message that more political will and commitment are needed to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. Some of the efforts under way at both the regional and the international level seem to be encouraging.

My delegation welcomes the signing of the Agreement on Gaza and Jericho on 4 May 1994 by the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The bold measures taken by Jordan and Israel in signing the Washington Declaration of 25 July 1994 deserve our warmest appreciation. These positive developments are basic elements in effectively addressing the protracted problems of the Middle East.

In accordance with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1964 and the various resolutions of the General Assembly, the Group of Experts to Prepare a Draft Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone has produced fruitful results. We warmly welcome the draft text of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty adopted at Addis Ababa and we call for its timely adoption. Such a successful outcome — after years of ongoing negotiations in our endeavours to establish nuclear-weapons-free zones — is an achievement not only for the continent of Africa, but also for the whole world. The final text of the treaty before us can be cited as one of our major successes in the post-cold-war period.

Although the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development held in 1986 entrusted the United Nations with a specific mandate for addressing the concerns emanating from the relationship between disarmament and development, the action programme adopted by consensus seems to be far from being implemented. We should once again stress the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development on the one hand and security and development on the other. One of the recent slogans is that development is peace. But we have failed to convince ourselves that we must overcome the challenges of development, which are, in fact, the root causes of many of the troubles disturbing our planet, and we have failed to commit ourselves to the task. We are encouraged to see the "Agenda for Peace" complemented by the "Agenda for Development". We look forward to the simultaneous implementation of the proposals contained in the United Nations peace and development agendas and in line with globally agreed principles.

The failure of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1994 substantive session to issue clear guidelines and recommendations with regard to nuclear disarmament and to the role of science and technology in the context of disarmament is indicative of the fact that we have a long way to go in order to bridge the gap.

Our optimism is further challenged by the lack of consensus in the deliberations at the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty, which was held at Geneva from 12 to 16 September 1994. We firmly believe that the non-proliferation Treaty is one of the most important international instruments prohibiting as it does the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The need for its extension cannot be questioned. It is my delegation's view that indefinite extension should be pursued if complementary actions are taken in other areas of nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, we are concerned with the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament on the negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. Ensuring the common and peaceful uses of nuclear technology and providing effective and verifiable security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States will undoubtedly help to bridge the gap that impedes progress in nuclear disarmament. We support the initiatives and the initial steps taken by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States for the suspension of nuclear tests.

The continued presence of anti-personnel land-mines needs our urgent attention since the threat posed by those less-visible devices is a concern that can never be overlooked. Today, there are approximately 85 million of such devices scattered throughout the world. This makes the ratio of anti-personnel land-mines one to every 50 persons, and those most affected by those hidden weapons are civilians. We look forward to concrete and practical commitment by the international community to render unreserved assistance in mine clearance. Our endeavours to curb the deadly threat posed by anti-personnel land-mines should also be extended to the prohibition of their use, production, stockpiling and distribution.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that we should be mindful of the lost decades in which there was no effective progress in disarmament and development. Now that East-West confrontation has given way to mutual understanding and cooperation, we should be able to seize this historic opportunity to the advantage of mankind. We should spare no effort to bridge our differences and maximize our common endeavours. Together, we can easily make a difference for the benefit of present and future generations.

**Mr. Baichorau** (Belarus) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of the Republic of Belarus would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to your very responsible post. We are sure that under your guidance the First Committee will work effectively.

The fundamental approach of the Republic of Belarus to resolving the problems of disarmament and international security is formulated in it new Constitution, which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet in March 1994. Article 18 of the Constitution states that the foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus shall be built upon the principles of equality of nations, the non-use of force or the threat of force, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs and other recognized principles and norms of international law. The aim of the Republic of Belarus is to make its territory a nuclear-free and neutral State. Belarus is taking up the practical tasks of its foreign policy in accordance with those constitutional foundation.

As a European State, Belarus is a full-fledged participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and is seeking to become a member of the Council of Europe and to conclude partnership agreements with the European countries and regional organizations.

Belarus is also prepared to support and comprehensively strengthen the role of the United Nations as the body primarily responsible for preserving international peace and security. We cannot underestimate the United Nations role in the localization and settlement of the armed conflicts which are breaking out on practically every continent. The Republic of Belarus will actively participate in the efforts of the United Nations to prevent such conflicts.

History has known of States that have become nuclear Powers, but until the decision taken by the Belarus parliament in February 1993 to ratify the strategic-arms-limitation (START) Treaty and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there has not been a single country that has renounced its nuclear status and become a non-nuclear State.

The Republic of Belarus believes that the April 1995 Review Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty could and should result in the indefinite extension of that Treaty. We would like all States Members of the United Nations to become parties to the Treaty. To ensure that, the five nuclear Powers should give additional security guarantees to non-nuclear States, within the Treaty framework. Security assurances could be also provided the non-nuclear countries in the form of a Security Council resolution under which its permanent members would assume the obligation, in the event of nuclear aggression, to take adequate measures to protect the security of the non-nuclear States. In addition, the Republic of Belarus welcomes further steps towards the elimination of nuclear-missile armaments, a process in which all the nuclear Powers should join. As it was stated by the Prime Minister of Belarus, His Excellency Mikhail Chygir, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, our country has expressed its solidarity with the proposal of the Russian Federation to draw up a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability.

The Republic of Belarus was one of the initiators of the proposal to convene the Special Conference in Geneva to strengthen the regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons. We support the creation of an inspection regime under that Convention. However, we believe it would not be right to impose in this connection any financial burden on the inspecting States.

The Republic of Belarus has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Treaty on Open Skies. Belarus is ready to participate in international non-proliferation regimes, to declare a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines, to facilitate the rapid

conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban Treaty and to work actively in other fields of arms control.

In this connection we would like to draw the attention of other delegations to the need to adopt, as soon as possible, a scheme to expand the membership of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, as proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan, following thorough preparatory work and multilateral consultations. The admission of new members could make the membership of the Conference on Disarmament more representative and its decisions more universally acceptable.

It is well known that the main international treaties in the field of arms control — the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the chemical weapons Convention and others — were drawn up in the years of the cold war, an era of rigid military, political and ideological confrontation. Total mutual mistrust was essentially the international context in which they were prepared. It seems that the time is ripe to begin to adapt these treaties to the new geostrategic realities, in which cooperation has replaced confrontation. A number of procedures envisaged in the disarmament treaties should be reconsidered and simplified. Belarus intends to continue to pursue a predictable and civilized policy in the field of arms control.

However, it seems to us that, so far, the contribution of Belarus to the process of disarmament and the strengthening of international security has not been fully appreciated. Our country has to reform and radically reduce the biggest army — in proportion to its population — in Europe: until recently, Belarus had one serviceman per 43 inhabitants. Under the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Belarus, with its 10 million inhabitants, has to eliminate the armaments and military equipment of an area containing the most powerful military concentration of tanks anywhere in the former Soviet Union. In quantitative terms, this greatly surpasses the armaments elimination programmes of the leading Western countries. The Government of the Republic of Belarus does not intend ever to violate its obligations under these treaties, but sometimes a situation can develop in such a way that the institution in charge of, for example, eliminating military equipment is simply unable for financial and economic reasons to continue its work. We are grateful to several industrially developed countries that have assisted Belarus in solving serious problems connected with the implementation of the CFE Treaty. However, the disproportionate burden that has been placed on our country in the field of disarmament may become simply too much for our national economy, which is experiencing major difficulties during this transitional period.

In conclusion, I should like to recall that representatives of the Republic of Belarus have more than once spoken in the United Nations about the possibility and the necessity of creating a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Since 1990, when this idea was first put forward, all intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles have been withdrawn from the territory of Belarus. The last intercontinental ballistic missile will leave our territory by the end of 1996. Corresponding steps in this direction are being taken by Ukraine. Recent developments in that region convince us that it is high time to move this issue from the stage of discussion to the stage of the initiation of practical steps to create such a zone.

**Mr. Muthaura** (Kenya): Let me join the representatives who have spoken before me in congratulating you on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. In congratulating you and the other members of the Bureau, I wish to take this opportunity to assure you of Kenya's full cooperation and support as we deliberate on the Committee's agenda.

This Committee is meeting at a time when we should collectively reflect on and re-evaluate the global changes that have recently taken place in the field of disarmament and international security. It is quite evident that with the end of the cold war we have witnessed some positive developments in this field: notably the substantial progress towards nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Russian Federation, the commencement by the Conference on Disarmament of substantive negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the opening of the process for the signature and ratification of the Convention on the Development, Prohibition, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Despite these positive developments, we face an increasing number of new challenges. Over the past year, the international community has witnessed an intensification of regional conflicts, which hinder international peace and security. The tragedy experienced in Rwanda remains unprecedented in the history of modern nations. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues despite attempts by the international community to assist the parties involved in reaching a negotiated and long-lasting agreement. We note with concern that the problems in Somalia continue with no

real and tangible solutions on the horizon. The peace processes in Liberia and Sudan also continue to be evasive. We are encouraged, however, by the peace prospects in Burundi, Mozambique, Angola, Haiti, the Middle East and the Korean peninsula.

While acknowledging that the fundamental responsibility of ensuring peace and stability lies with individual countries, we stress that the international community has an important role to play by supporting these national efforts through the strengthening of democratic processes and the establishment of global programmes geared towards the alleviation of human degradation and the socio-political and economic problems experienced in many parts of the world, particularly in the developing countries. The attainment of global peace and security is intrinsically interwoven with the solution of the blistering poverty and indebtedness of the developing countries.

Most of the conflicts we are witnessing today confirm to us that security cannot be fragmented or viewed in a narrow or regional context but should be tackled through a genuinely comprehensive approach. Kenya shares the view that peace is not only the absence of war but the absence of any threat of war. We reaffirm our belief that security based on an anachronistic "deterrence" theory cannot guarantee world peace. The international community should therefore put into effect the system of security envisaged in the United Nations Charter, based on the legal and political foundations of the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and collective action in the maintenance of international peace and security.

We believe that concrete measures of confidence and trust have to exist among nations in order for them to disarm and develop peacefully. The application of confidence-building measures and the maintenance of good relations with all countries are vital factors in eliminating barriers of mistrust and are priorities of Kenya's foreign policy. It is our view that the goal of confidence-building is to create mutual trust and favourable conditions for the enhancement of world disarmament, peace and security. The enhancement and application of confidence-building measures on regional and subregional levels are therefore an integral part of our global disarmament endeavour.

Kenya supports the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and views it as a mechanism designed to enhance confidence among States. It is expected that expanding the scope of the Register would allow it to develop into an important international confidence-building mechanism that would create a desired transparency both in international arms transfers and in national production of arms. Its objective should be the reduction of conventional armaments to the lowest possible level consistent with the legitimate security needs of States. While acknowledging the work and conclusions of the governmental group of experts charged with the responsibility of examining the possible expansion of the scope of the Register, my delegation is of the view that the Register should be expanded in such a manner as to ensure that those responsible for production and stockpiling have the same degree of obligation and commitment as those responsible for imports and exports. In other words, production and stockpiling should be institutionalized in the Register. There is no doubt in our minds that irresponsible trade in arms has been the main cause of the brutal and prolonged conflicts that continue to preoccupy the international community. Governments, individually and collectively, have a responsibility to regulate the arms trade. Towards that end, the United Nations should enhance its capability to monitor the activities of Member States in this area.

We wish to reiterate our conviction that regional and global disarmament are complementary and should be pursued simultaneously. It is in this regard that we support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We particularly welcome the progress made towards drafting a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. We request that continued support be given in order to finalize the drafting of the treaty.

We are cognizant of the initiative for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and request that support be given to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean as it continues its task of addressing new alternative approaches to the achievement of the goals set forth in the Declaration as well as to its own future role. We welcome the increased participation of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee at its last session and hope that the few major maritime Powers that are not active will resume their participation. With the emphasis on new alternative approaches, the objectives of the Ad Hoc Committee have been widened to cater for broader interests in regard to international peace and security during the post-cold-war era.

The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an important instrument, one which should be used more effectively towards the promotion of international peace and security. The universal application of the Treaty should serve as the cornerstone of disarmament efforts aimed at the elimination

of all nuclear weapons. In that regard, maximum support should be given to the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that are taking place in the Conference on Disarmament. We acknowledge the role that the Treaty would play in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We further welcome the continuing efforts of the President of the Amendment Conference of the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to ensure a complementary relationship between the forum and the Conference on Disarmament in the achievement of a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Kenya subscribes to the view that a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Such a treaty should, however, be non-discriminatory, effectively, verifiable and have universal application.

We are convinced that security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons. An internationally binding convention should be reached on this issue.

The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields has to be re-emphasized. There is a need for improved modalities to guarantee the transfer and utilization of technology for peaceful purposes. Global efforts would require the development of mechanisms to facilitate multilateral cooperation in the promotion and diversion of military technology for peaceful purposes.

We welcome the increasing awareness among the international community of the positive role that science and technology can play in the verification of existing and future disarmament measures. Such applications of science and technology can contribute to confidence-building by providing the means to achieve greater transparency in military matters.

*The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.*